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INTRODUCTION 
On March 26, 2010, the governor of Utah made national 
news by signing a new statute giving the state eminent domain 
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authority over almost all federal lands in Utah.1 At the same 
time, the governor signed a measure to allocate $3 million from 
the state’s school trust fund to support litigation over the new 
authority,2 which seems clearly unconstitutional under the 
U.S. Constitution’s Property and Supremacy Clauses.3 Some of 
the bill’s proponents urged the state to exercise its new emi-
nent domain power over the Grand Staircase-Escalante Na-
tional Monument, which was established by President Clinton 
in defiance of Utah’s elected representatives and is still a sore 
point among many residents.4 At a February 2010 hearing, a 
former U.S. Supreme Court law clerk and assistant U.S. attor-
ney, Mike Lee, testified in favor of the discredited legal theory 
behind the bill.5 Three months later, Lee shocked the Washing-
ton political establishment by defeating three-term incumbent 
Bob Bennett for the Republican nomination in Utah’s Senate 
race.6 Lee won the seat the following November.7 By early 
2011, six additional western state legislatures considered simi-
lar laws.8 In March, the Montana legislature joined the “legal 
challenge of federal land rights” by passing an eminent domain 
bill authorizing the state to acquire nationally owned lands.9 
 
 1. H.B. 143, 58th Leg., Gen. Sess., 2010 Utah 1258 (codified at UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78B-6-503.5 (West 2010)). 
 2. H.B. 323, 2010 Legis. Gen. Counsel, Gen. Sess. (Utah 2010) ($1 million 
per year for three years), available at http://le.utah.gov/~2010/bills/hbillint/ 
hb0323.pdf; Scott Streater, Utah Eminent Domain Law More Than a ‘Message 
Bill,’ LAND LETTER, Apr. 1, 2010, http://www.eenews.net/public/ 
Landletter/2010/04/01/1.  
 3. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 4. Utah Enacts States Rights Challenge to Federal Lands, PUB. LAND NEWS, 
Apr. 2, 2010, at 5. 
 5. Phil Taylor, U.S. Not ‘Sovereign’ Over Federal Lands, Utah GOP Senate 
Candidate Says, LAND LETTER, July 1, 2010, http://www.eenews.net/ 
public/Landletter/2010/07/01/1. 
 6. Jeff Zeleny, Nikki Haley Is Winner in South Carolina Runoff, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/23/us/politics/ 
23elect.html?scp=1&sq=Nikki%20Haley%20Is%20Winner%20in%20South%20Car
olina%20Runoff&st=cse. 
 7. New Faces in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at 5. 
 8. Kirk Johnson, Rallying for States’ Rights, G.O.P. Legislators Tell Wash-
ington to Go Away, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2011, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/j/kirk_johnson/index.ht
ml?offset=50&s=newest (follow “States’ Rights a Priority for G.O.P.-Led Legisla-
tures” hyperlink). 
 9. Stephen Dockery, Montana House Backs Bill Giving Montana Authority 
Over Federal Land, RAVALLI REPUBLIC, Mar. 31, 2011, http://ravallirepublic.com/ 
news/state-and-regional/article_59555386-1da0-533e-aa56-d96dfd7217e2.html 
(quoting bill supporter Montana Rep. Jonathan McNiven). On April 8, 2011, the 
legislature transmitted the bill to the governor, who has not yet acted on the stat-
ute, but he has indicated that he would veto anti-federal bills. Detailed Bill In-
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Why would Utah throw millions of dollars down the drain 
of futile litigation?10 Indeed, why even promote end-run tactics 
around federal authority instead of employing existing statuto-
ry avenues to influence public land management? The answer, 
of course, is politics. Utah is investing in fuel to stoke the fires 
of local frustration with federal control over public natural re-
sources. The political movement feeding on this frustration, 
compounded by judicial setbacks, goes by many names today. 
But the original label is the “Sagebrush Rebellion.”11 
The Sagebrush Rebellion was born of similarly hopeless lit-
igation which increased traditional commodity users’ anger 
about their perceived loss of control over federal land manage-
ment. The story of Kleppe v. New Mexico12 illustrates how liti-
gation itself, even when it yields no judicial relief, can serve as 
a powerful organizing tool for political movements.13 Social sci-
ence scholarship richly documents this phenomenon in the con-
text of the civil rights and economic justice movements.14 But it 
has yet to illuminate an enduring counterweight to federal con-
trol over public lands: the Sagebrush Rebellion. As with other 
political and social movements, the anti-federal sentiment in 
Utah and Montana (like New Mexico and Nevada before them) 
can be sustained by “successful failures.”15 
 
formation: SB 254, MONT. LEGISLATURE, http://laws.leg.mt.gov/law 
s11/law0203w$.startup (find “Bill Type and Number” SB 254) (last visited Oct. 2, 
2011); Johnson, supra note 8. (“The governor, who is from a family of ranchers, 
said he had just registered a cattle brand that spelled out the word ‘veto.’ ”). 
 10. Utah is just now gearing up for litigation, having expended funds appro-
priated by the 2010 law to prepare a notice of intent to file suit. The suit claims 
rights-of-way in the Garfield County portion of the Grand Staircase-Escalante Na-
tional Monument. E-mail from John Hurst, Senior Policy Advisor, Utah Pub. 
Lands Policy Coordination Office, to Jeremiah Williamson (June 9, 2011, 4:48 PM) 
(on file with author). 
 11. See generally John D. Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, 
Politics and Federal Lands, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 317 (1980). 
 12. 426 U.S. 529 (1976). 
 13. See MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND 
THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 278–80 (1994) (discussing how movement-
building outcomes can be more important than direct policy results or the creation 
of new rights); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, 
PUBLIC POLICY AND POLITICAL CHANGE 8 (Univ. of Mich. 2d ed. 2004) (1974) 
(same). 
 14. See, e.g., CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, 
AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998); EVE S. WEINBAUM, 
TO MOVE A MOUNTAIN: FIGHTING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY IN APPALACHIA (2004). 
We relate this literature to the Sagebrush Rebellion. See infra Part IV. 
 15. WEINBAUM, supra note 14, at 267. 
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This Article aims to understand a landmark Supreme 
Court decision as a crucial early spark of the rebellion by ex-
ploring the case’s context and political significance. Such an 
approach explains why a state would embark on an expensive 
and risky legal strategy. It also counters the conventional nar-
rative that Kleppe stands for expansive federal power under 
the Constitution’s Property Clause.16 While that accurately 
characterizes the legal holding, it fails to account for the case’s 
role in establishing a strong and ongoing movement to offset 
federal control over public natural resources. Even as Congress 
increasingly offers “cooperative federalism” for states to influ-
ence public land management,17 the Kleppe litigation’s legacy 
of “un-cooperative federalism” remains a common and effective 
response.18 
In recent years, several popular essay collections have 
deepened our understanding of fields such as environmental, 
administrative, and constitutional law by telling the “stories” of 
court decisions.19 Storytelling reveals the complex motivations 
and background facts of parties and disputes.20 It counteracts 
the tendency of theory to gloss over particulars that reveal im-
 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3., cl. 2. 
 17. Cooperative federalism is an arrangement of power under which a nation-
al government induces coordination from subordinate jurisdictions. Robert L. 
Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. 
L.J. 179, 200 (2005); see also infra notes 268–71, 318–24 and accompanying text 
(discussing cooperative federalism). 
 18. We employ the term “un-cooperative federalism” to contrast the legacy of 
Kleppe with the common statutory approaches to cooperative federalism. See, e.g., 
Kirk Johnson, States’ Rights Is Rallying Cry for Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 
2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/003/17/us/17states.html (discussing the continued 
popularity of “un-cooperative federalism”); see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen & 
Heather Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009) (develop-
ing a framework for understanding different kinds of un-cooperative federalism); 
infra notes 322–26 and accompanying text. Along the continuum from polite con-
versation toward restrained disagreement, to “fighting words,” our example of un-
cooperative federalism is on the far end of, and possibly beyond, civil disobedience. 
Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra, at 1271; see also infra notes 324–28 and accom-
panying text. 
 19. See generally ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006); 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES (Michael C. Dorf ed., Found. Press 2009) (2004); 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005).  
 20. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 1–6, 14–21 
(Univ. of Cal. Press 2002) (1976) (stories unmask the participants in legal dis-
putes and illuminate underlying humanity). See generally JAMES BOYD WHITE, 
THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (Univ. of Chi. Press 1985) (1973) (seminal work on the 
role of narrative in understanding the meaning of law). 
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portant aspects of legal developments.21 There is no collection 
of natural resource or federal public land stories, and they are 
almost entirely absent from the Environmental Law Stories 
anthology.22 If there were such a collection, surely Kleppe 
would warrant treatment as a critical buttress of modern natu-
ral resources law.23 All of the major natural resources case-
books feature Kleppe v. New Mexico as a principal case.24 But 
the story of Kleppe teaches more about public land lawmaking 
 
 21. Paul Gewirtz, Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, in LAW’S STORIES: 
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 2, 6 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 
1996). Perhaps more relevant to the Kleppe story is its “healthy disruption and 
challenge to [legal doctrine, economic analysis, or philosophic theory].” Martha 
Minow, Stories in Law, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW, 
supra, at 24, 36. But see JOHN COPELAND NAGLE, LAW’S ENVIRONMENT: HOW THE 
LAW SHAPES THE PLACES WE LIVE 251 (2010) (“[S]torytelling, like the Sun in the 
sky, obscures as much as it reveals.”) (quoting Timothy Ferris). 
 22. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES, supra note 19. However, Ol-
iver Houck has told the stories of several natural resources cases, including for-
eign ones. See OLIVER A. HOUCK, TAKING BACK EDEN: EIGHT ENVIRONMENTAL 
CASES THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (2010); Oliver Houck, The Water, the Trees, 
and the Land: Three Nearly Forgotten Cases that Changed the American Land-
scape, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2279, 2291–99 (1996) (recounting the United States’ land 
law story of West Virginia Division of the Izzak Walton League v. Butz, 522 F.2d 
945 (4th Cir. 1975)); id. at 2300–08 (recounting the story of Natural Resources De-
fense Council v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974), aff’d, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976)); Oliver Houck, Unfinished Stories, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 867, 909–21 
(2002) (recounting the United States’ land law story of Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 
U.S. 727 (1972)). 
 23. The Kleppe decision immediately attracted scholarship in law journals 
and continues to be a foundational reference point for articles and student notes 
on natural resources and public land law. See, e.g., Peter A. Appel, The Power of 
Congress “Without Limitation”: The Property Clause and Federal Regulation of 
Private Property, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2001); Eugene R. Gaetke, Refuting the 
“Classic” Property Clause Theory, 63 N.C. L. REV. 617, 617–20 (1985); Dale D. 
Goble, The Myth of the Classic Property Clause Doctrine, 63 DENV. U. L. REV. 495 
(1986) (arguing against those who adhere to Property Clause theories inconsistent 
with the holding of Kleppe); Blake Shepard, The Scope of Congress’ Constitutional 
Power Under the Property Clause: Regulating Non-Federal Property to Further the 
Purposes of National Parks and Wilderness Areas, 11 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
479, 489–90, 498–514 (1984); Margaret Elizabeth Plumb, Note, Expansion of Na-
tional Power Under the Property Clause: Federal Regulation of Wildlife, 12 LAND 
& WATER L. REV. 181 (1977); Louis Touton, Note, The Property Power, Federalism, 
and the Equal Footing Doctrine, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 817, 823–25, 834–39 (1980); 
Linda Williams, Note, Constitutionality of the Free Roaming Wild Horses and 
Burros Act: The Ecosystem and the Property Clause in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 7 
ENVTL. L. 137 (1976). 
 24. See GEORGE C. COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES 
LAW 163 (6th ed. 2007); CHRISTINE A. KLEIN ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: A 
PLACE-BASED BOOK OF PROBLEMS AND CASES 90 (2d ed. 2009); JAN G. LAITOS ET 
AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 1202 (2006); JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL 
RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 148 (2d ed. 2009). 
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than the Court’s expounding on the Constitution’s Property 
Clause. 
Kleppe dramatizes the changing relationship between live- 
stock ranchers and the public rangelands. It describes how as-
sertion of federal power advancing national conservation objec-
tives collided with traditional, local economic interests on pub-
lic lands. The legislation challenged in Kleppe—the Wild Free-
Roaming Horses and Burros Act (WFRHBA)25—diminished the 
influence of states and ranchers over federal rangelands. The 
Kleppe decision resoundingly approved federal authority to 
reprioritize uses of the public resources, including wildlife, and 
spurred a lasting backlash in the western United States (the 
West). Further legislation passed in the wake of Kleppe intensi-
fied this political unrest into the full-blown Sagebrush Rebel-
lion. Though the Kleppe litigation failed to undermine Con-
gress’s public land reform agenda, the Sagebrush Rebellion 
lived to fight another day. 
In 1970, the Public Land Law Review Commission outlined 
a reform agenda for Congress.26 The 1971 Wild Free-Roaming 
Horses and Burros Act27 was not a part of that agenda, but it 
turned out to be the opening salvo in a decade-long battle over 
public land lawmaking. The 1971 law signaled the diminution 
of ranchers’ power over public rangelands in the legislative 
realm, and the litigation that followed further threatened the 
influence of the graziers. However, adjudicated rights do not 
necessarily translate into social facts.28 This Article argues 
that a strictly legal evaluation of the Kleppe litigation fails to 
measure its true significance as a galvanizing event for the 
Sagebrush Rebellion of the 1970s and the subsequent “wise 
use” wars over public lands.29 The Article proceeds in four 
parts. 
 
 25. Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, Pub. L. No. 92-195, 85 Stat. 
649 (1971) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1340 (2006)). 
 26. PUB. LAND LAW REVIEW COMM’N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S LAND 
(1970). 
 27. Pub. L. No. 92-195, 85 Stat. 649. 
 28. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 13, at 3–9. 
 29. See ROBERT B. KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE: ECOSYSTEMS, 
DEMOCRACY, AND AMERICA’S PUBLIC LANDS (2003) (discussing “wise use” wars 
that succeeded the Sagebrush Rebellion); WESTERN PUBLIC LANDS AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (Charles Davis ed., 2d ed. 2001); Florance Williams, 
Sagebrush Rebellion II, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Feb. 24, 1992, at 1. Even today, a 
Utah group opposing federal management of roads on public lands calls itself the 
Sagebrush Coalition. Jen Jackson, The Revolution Will Be Motorized, HIGH 
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Part I of this Article sets the stage for the story of Kleppe 
by reviewing the history of ranching conflict on public lands, 
and the legislation addressing allocation of scarce rangeland 
resources. While rangeland reform of the 1930s aimed at soil 
conservation imposed new regulations on public land graziers, 
that purpose served the long-term interest of ranchers. In con-
trast, the 1971 Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act dis-
placed ranching as the de facto priority use of public range- 
lands and helped trigger the Sagebrush Rebellion. 
Part II focuses on the lawsuit challenging the 1971 statute 
and describes the stakeholders, arguments, and ultimate reso-
lution by the U.S. Supreme Court. Delivered by a unanimous 
Court, Kleppe v. New Mexico now stands as the leading case in-
terpreting the Constitution’s Property Clause as a very broad 
grant of power to Congress. Though New Mexico failed to per-
suade even a single Justice, its litigation promoted greater po-
litical momentum in the West to resist public natural resources 
law reform. 
Part III shows how that resistance shaped the Sagebrush 
Rebellion. Shortly after the Kleppe decision, Congress enacted 
a comprehensive charter for rangeland management that fur-
ther inflamed ranchers. They sought to undermine the new 
statute and other legislation reforming public land administra-
tion. While states participated in the cooperative federalism 
procedures provided by the legislation, they also engaged in 
“un-cooperative federalism” through a series of direct challeng-
es to national resource management authority. Part III also 
examines the federal legislation and an ill-fated attempt by 
Nevada to control public rangelands. 
Part IV explores the ways in which social science scholar-
ship helps explain how New Mexico, and subsequently other 
western states, made lemonade out of courthouse losses. The 
political consequences of the “un-cooperative” challenges to fed-
eral power mostly aided ranchers and other interest groups as-
sociated with western state governments. Their embattled soli-
darity helped elect sympathetic officials (such as Senator Mike 
Lee) and profoundly influenced implementation of the public 
land statutes. 
 
COUNTRY NEWS, June 14, 2011, http://www.hcn.org/hcn/wotr/the-revolution-will-
be-motorized. 
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I. PUBLIC RANGELAND LAW 
The federal government today manages nearly 330 million 
acres of public rangelands mostly scattered across sixteen 
western states.30 The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 
oversees roughly 160 million acres of these lands, divided into 
more than 21,000 allotments authorized for grazing under 
nearly 18,000 permits.31 The Forest Service manages grazing 
on an additional 96 million acres of public land.32 The size of 
this part of the public estate has changed little since the 1930s. 
Before then, disposal dominated federal public land policy.33 
The United States divested itself of considerable acreage 
through statehood and homestead acts, railroad grants, and 
other devices.34 Disposal flowed from the premise that “the 
public domain ought to be thrown open to private development, 
free of charge and unfettered by government regulation.”35 
However, the federal government retained a substantial 
amount of dry, rocky land that was not suitable for agriculture 
and valuable only as pasturage.36 These relatively infertile 
western lands constitute the majority of the public range-
lands.37 
A. Rangeland Conflict and the Taylor Grazing Act 
Competition for scarce resources—forage and water—
prompted disputes on the public rangelands.38 In the early 
years of grazing on public rangelands, beginning in the 1880s, 
“adjudication of range rights . . . was mostly by sword and pis-
 
 30. About Rangelands, U. S. FOREST SERVICE, http://www.fs.fed.us/ 
rangelands/whoweare/index.shtml (last visited May 4, 2011). 
 31. Fact Sheet on the BLM’s Management of Livestock Grazing, BUREAU OF 
LAND MGMT., http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/grazing.html (last updated Sept. 
27, 2011). 
 32. About Rangelands, supra note 30. 
 33. Disposal involves the transfer of property out of federal ownership. 
MARION CLAWSON & BURNELL HELD, THE FEDERAL LANDS: THEIR USE AND 
MANAGEMENT 5–7, 17, 22–27 (1957). 
 34. COGGINS ET AL., supra note 24, at 89–117. 
 35. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Law of the American West: A Critical Bibliog-
raphy of the Nonlegal Sources, 85 MICH. L. REV. 955, 1003 (1987). 
 36. Phillip O. Foss, The Determination of Grazing Fees on Federally-Owned 
Range Lands, 41 J. FARM ECON. 535, 535 (1959). 
 37. DEBRA L. DONAHUE, THE WESTERN RANGE REVISITED 13 (1999). 
 38. Foss, supra note 36. 
2011] STORY OF KLEPPE V. NEW MEXICO 109 
tol.”39 Among the conflicts later known as the “range wars” 
were the Johnson County and Upper Green River wars in Wy-
oming, the Tonto Basin War in Arizona, and a number of other 
conflicts in places like the Blue Mountains of Oregon.40 These 
fights over resources often pitted graziers against each other 
(large vs. small operations, or cattle vs. sheep ranchers) or 
against homesteaders.41 In 1885, Congress reacted to the con-
flicts by passing the Unlawful Enclosures Act,42 which limited 
one tool that ranchers had used to exclude others: fences. This 
was but the first of many federal restrictions to come. 
Once the range wars quieted, Congress mostly ignored the 
rangelands for the next fifty years. Founding Forest Service 
Chief, Gifford Pinchot, exercised his broad (but vague) legisla-
tive authority to impose permit requirements on graziers using 
national forest rangelands.43 The backlash from ranchers was 
fierce.44 But passive neglect characterized federal management 
over most public rangelands, especially outside of the national 
forests. Thus, the classic “tragedy of the commons” unfolded, 
resulting in overgrazing of public lands.45 
The slow recognition of range degradation resulting from 
government mismanagement laid the groundwork for reform.46 
By the early 1900s, overgrazing already had noticeably reduced 
the capacity of the public range to support livestock.47 Still, it 
took the great dust storms of the mid-1930s to prompt congres-
sional enactment of the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 and its 
1936 amendments.48 The Act guided management of federally 
owned rangelands, focusing primarily on preventing degrada-
 
 39. M.W. Talbot & F.P. Cronemiller, Some of the Beginnings of Range Man-
agement, 14 J. RANGE MGMT. 95, 95–96 (1961). 
 40. Id. 
 41. DONAHUE, supra note 37, at 20–21. 
 42. 43 U.S.C. § 1061 (2006); see also Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 
668, 684 (1979). 
 43. See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) (upholding grazing 
permits and fees notwithstanding that there is no mention of them in the legisla-
tion authorizing national forest management). 
 44. Houck, The Water, the Trees, and the Land, supra note 22, at 2302–03. 
 45. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968) 
(using overgrazing as illustration of “tragedy of the commons” where no user of 
common resources can exclude others). 
 46. Talbot & Cronemiller, supra note 39, at 97. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Taylor Grazing Act, ch. 865, 48 stat. 1269 (1934) (codified as amended at 
43 U.S.C. § 315 (2006)); see also E. LOUISE PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC 
DOMAIN: DISPOSAL AND RESERVATION POLICIES 1900–50, at 214–24 (1951) (de-
scribing history of the Act). 
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tion and thus stabilizing the livestock industry. It authorized 
the Secretary of the Interior to establish grazing districts and 
to manage them through permits.49 The Act expressed the 
then-dominant view that livestock grazing was “the highest use 
of the public lands pending its final disposal.”50 The disposal 
language meant that “the federal government considered public 
lands as temporary holdings to be claimed, privatized, and 
homesteaded as the nation matured.”51 Paradoxically, however, 
the Taylor Grazing Act, by authorizing active management of 
unreserved federal lands, effectively closed the window on “un-
restricted entry” of the public lands.52 
In practice, the Taylor Grazing Act operated for the benefit 
of ranchers.53 The Interior Department delegated most im-
portant decisions to local grazing districts and boards. Grazing 
advisory boards composed exclusively of ranchers worked with 
“stockmen” district administrators to manage rangelands and 
determine proper grazing intensities.54 “To Western stockmen, 
these may have been public lands, but they were their public 
lands.”55 Despite the reforms of the 1970s, which implemented 
environmental regulations and comprehensive federal resource 
planning regimes, the Taylor Grazing Act remains the basic le-
gal framework for allocating range resources.56 
B. The Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act 
Limited water and forage for livestock, which often 
brought ranchers into conflict with each other, also pitted the 
 
 49. See 43 U.S.C. § 315 (2006). 
 50. Id. Congress twice amended the Act to open up more public lands to live-
stock grazing. In 1936, Congress increased the acreage that could be included in 
grazing districts from eighty million acres to 142 million acres. Act of June 26, 
1936, Pub. L. No. 827, ch. 842, 49 Stat. 1976. Eighteen years later, Congress re-
moved the acreage limitation altogether. Act of May 28, 1954, Pub. L. No. 375, ch. 
243, 68 Stat. 151. 
 51. Nancie G. Marzulla, Property Rights Movement: How It Began and Where 
It Is Headed, in A WOLF IN THE GARDEN 39 (Philip D. Brick & R. McGreggor Caw-
ley eds., 1996) (discussing pre-1964 Interior Department policy). 
 52. PUB. LAND LAW REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 26, at 43. 
 53. See Richard H. Braun, Emerging Limits on Federal Land Management 
Discretion: Livestock, Riparian Ecosystems and Clean Water Law, 17 ENVTL. L. 
43, 52–58 (1986); George Cameron Coggins & Margaret Lindberg-Johnson, The 
Law of Public Rangeland Management II: The Commons and the Taylor Act, 13 
ENVTL. L. 1, 100 (1982). 
 54. Houck, The Water, the Trees, and the Land, supra note 22, at 2303. 
 55. Id. at 2301. 
 56. See infra text accompanying notes 315–23. 
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primary users of the public range against wild burros and 
horses. Horses and burros compete directly with livestock for 
water and forage.57 Compounding this conflict, horses and bur-
ros lack limits on population growth because they have no nat-
ural predators on the rangelands.58 The wild horses and burros 
that inhabit North America are not native species, but are the 
descendants of strays and abandoned animals.59 The oldest lin-
eage traces its roots to the Spanish conquistadors60 but today it 
accounts for only a small fraction of the horses and burros in-
habiting the public lands.61 The majority of the horses in fact 
owe their existence to the resolute ability of animals that 
strayed or were abandoned, often when economic circumstanc-
es changed, to survive in a harsh land.62 
The American market demands little horsemeat, and wild 
horses interfered with the more profitable use of public range-
lands, namely livestock grazing. Therefore, although many 
ranchers tolerated wild horses for both aesthetic and commer-
cial reasons, others viewed the horses as feral pests.63 As a re-
sult, federal agents frequently removed wild horses and burros 
from the public range.64 Federal agents, however, were not the 
only people taking wild burros and horses from the public 
lands. In fact, virtually every western state legislature provid-
ed state agencies with the authority to remove abandoned, 
stray, or unbranded burros and horses.65 Such laws provided a 
 
 57. Kenneth P. Pitt, The Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act: A West-
ern Melodrama, 15 ENVTL. L. 503, 511 (1985) (noting “definite temporal and spa-
tial overlap between wild horses and other species”). 
 58. Id. at 505. 
 59. Id. at 505–06. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. RICHARD SYMANSKI, WILD HORSES AND SACRED COWS 131 (1985). Besides 
horsemeat, the other major commercial use of wild horses was slaughter for the 
production of glue. See, e.g., Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 176 (1956). 
 64. See, e.g., Hatahley, 351 U.S at 176 (involving federal officers removing 
free-roaming horses pursuant to Utah’s abandoned horse statute). Though some 
“removed” animals would be shot on site, others would be sold for horsemeat or 
glue feedstock. Id. 
 65. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 3-1336 (1952); CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 
16521 (West 1933); COLO. REV. STAT. § 35-44-101 (1969); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 25-
2309 (1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-14-1 (1966); NEV. REV. STAT. § 569.120 (1961); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 607.007 (1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 4-25-1 (West 1953); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 11-24-101 (1913); see also Protection of Wild Horses on Public Lands: 
Hearing on H.R. 795 and H.R. 5375 Before the H. Subcomm. on Pub. Lands of the 
H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong. 147–50 (1971) [hereinafter 
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useful tool for many ranchers who valued the presence of the 
horses and burros, but at the same time recognized that a lack 
of natural predators necessitated population culling.66 
When the demand for pet food made horse hunting a prof-
itable venture, the broad language of state estray laws facili-
tated a new business.67 Private profiteers pursued the horses, 
often utilizing appalling tactics. One author summarized the 
process as follows: 
Low-flying airplanes drove the wild horses towards mount-
ed cowboys who fired shotguns at the horses to make them 
run faster. Captured horses were tied to large truck tires to 
exhaust them and make them easier to handle. Exhausted, 
they would be packed into trucks so tight that only their 
weight against each other held them up. Foals, weighing 
less, often were abandoned to die. Seeking maximum prof-
its, often six and a half cents a pound, the hunters seldom 
fed or watered the horses and many died en route to the 
slaughterhouse.68 
Such atrocities gained national media attention during the 
1950s, resulting in the passage of the Wild Horse Annie Act,69 
which prohibited both the poisoning of watering holes and the 
use of motorized vehicles to hunt horses and burros.70 
However, the Wild Horse Annie Act failed to protect the 
wild horses and burros because hunters simply resorted to non-
motorized means of capture.71 Moreover, state livestock boards 
continued to remove animals interfering with commercial graz-
 
House Hearings] (statement of Dean Prosser, President, International Livestock 
Brand Conference). 
 66. SYMANSKI, supra note 63, at 65; see also Pitt, supra note 57, at 517 n.75 
(noting that before the Act, ranchers often managed horse populations in coopera-
tion with horse advocacy groups). 
 67. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., DEP’T OF INTERIOR, OUR PUBLIC LANDS 3 (1980) 
[hereinafter OUR PUBLIC LANDS]. 
 68. Pitt, supra note 57, at 506. 
 69. Pub. L. No. 86-234, 73 Stat. 470 (1959) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 47 (2006)). The Act is named after Velma B. Johnston, also known as Wild Horse 
Annie, who led the Wild Horse Organized Assistance and dedicated her life to pro-
tecting free-roaming horses. See Velma B. Johnston, The Fight to Save a Memory, 
50 TEX. L. REV. 1055 (1972), for Ms. Johnston’s account of her experiences with 
common wild-horse-gathering practices and her efforts to protect the wild horse. 
 70. 18 U.S.C. § 47 (2006). The Act’s actual prohibition is for “pollution” of wa-
tering holes for the purpose of trapping, killing, wounding, or maiming. Id. 
 71. Pitt, supra note 57, at 506–07; see also Johnston, supra note 69, at 1057–
59 (suggesting that the Wild Horse Annie Act was only half-heartedly enforced in 
the West, in part due to the influence of livestock interests). 
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ing.72 In response, Congress reformed public rangelands man-
agement with the WFRHBA.73 This Act gave sweeping protec-
tions to all unclaimed and unbranded horses and burros on 
public lands, prohibiting their capture, branding, harassment, 
and killing.74 It “essentially reversed BLM’s grassland man-
agement policy,”75 declaring wild burros and horses to be “an 
integral part of the natural system of the public lands.”76 How-
ever, the horses and burros do considerable damage to the 
rangeland ecosystems: 
By passage of [the WFRHBA] the U.S. Congress declared 
that it felt it had the power to override the results of 
500,000 years of separate evolution of New World and Old 
World equid lineages, and furthermore invalidated the ex-
tinction of North American equids near the end of the Pleis-
tocene. Congress may have given legal status to these nox-
ious herbivores, but Congress sees the natural world 
through a different visual filter than serious ecologists.77 
The WFRHBA directed the BLM to shift its attention from 
managing grazing for the long-term benefit of ranching to “pro-
tection of specific rangeland resources,” including horses and 
burros.78 
This revolution in rangeland management hurt livestock 
ranchers who grazed cattle and sheep on public lands. Federal 
protection of wild horses and burros resulted in more competi-
tion with livestock for forage and water.79 The Act indirectly 
required ranchers to subsidize horse and burro access to water 
with extra fuel to run well pumps and repair horse and burro-
caused damage, thus increasing the operating costs of an al-
ready marginally profitable industry.80 Ranchers correctly 
 
 72. SYMANSKI, supra note 63, at 129. 
 73. Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, Pub. L. No. 92-195, 85 Stat. 
649 (1971) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1340 (2006)). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Pitt, supra note 57, at 515. 
 76. 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). 
 77. Bruce E. Coblentz, Letter to the Editor, 13 NAT. AREAS J. 3, 3 (1993). 
 78. Today, the WFRHBA joins a host of other statutes that direct BLM to em-
brace such rangeland resources as riparian areas, threatened and endangered 
species, sensitive plant species, and cultural or historical objects. Fact Sheet on 
the BLM’s Management of Livestock Grazing, supra note 31. Focusing on these 
objectives may impair ranching interests. 
 79. See SYMANSKI, supra note 63, at 137–39. 
 80. Id. at 137–38. The operator of one ranch estimated that the damage from 
wild horses resulted in a $50,000 per year increase in operating costs. Id. at 137. 
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sensed that the 1971 law signaled a loss of control over public 
rangelands. 
Even though statutory protections for horses and burros 
imposed costs on ranching, the legislative history displays in-
difference toward these economic harms.81 Support for the leg-
islation and the plight of the wild horse dominated the congres-
sional hearings, with representatives taking considerable time 
to pat themselves on the back for engaging in so worthy a 
cause.82 Congressman after congressman made the case 
against the “savage destruction”83 of the “living symbols of the 
historic significance and pioneer spirit of the West,”84 each time 
generating responses of congratulation and thanks from other 
representatives.85 When the first witness to testify introduced 
a letter from a nine-year-old Michigan girl stating that “[e]very 
time the men come to kill the horses for pet food, I think you 
kill many children’s hearts,”86 committee members commended 
and thanked him for his efforts.87 
When ranchers did get their chance to testify, they were on 
the defensive. Much time was devoted to refuting accusations 
that ranchers were engaging in the wholesale slaughter of 
horses.88 Karl Weikel, who testified on behalf of the American 
National Cattlemen’s Association and the American National 
Wool Growers Association, began by explaining that “the issue 
has been clouded by controversy, accusations, counteraccusa-
tions and recriminations based mostly upon misunderstanding 
of, and impatience with, past mistakes, abuses, misuses and 
poor management decisions resulting from mistaken policy and 
 
 81. See Pitt, supra note 57, at 513. See generally House Hearings, supra note 
65; Protection of Wild Horses and Burros on Public Lands: Hearing on S. 862, S. 
1116, S. 1090, and S. 1119 Before the S. Subcomm. on Pub. Lands of the S. Comm. 
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong. 23–24 (1971) (statements of Sen. 
Church acknowledging the “many heartfelt letters the committee has received 
from schoolchildren throughout the Nation urging the preservation of wild horses 
and burros”). 
 82. House Hearings, supra note 65, at 10–16 (statements of Reps. Johnson, 
Foley, Roncalio, Williams, Steiger, and Baring). 
 83. Id. at 14 (statement of Rep. Williams). 
 84. Id. at 17 (statement of Rep. Gude). 
 85. See, e.g., id. at 16 (statements of Reps. Dellenback, Baring, and Williams). 
 86. Id. at 19 (statement of Gregory Gude, son of Rep. Gude); see also id. at 
137 (testimony of Hope Ryden), for another child’s letter expressing support for 
the plight of the wild horse. 
 87. Id. at 19–20 (statements of Reps. Steiger, Saylor, and Dellenback). 
 88. See, e.g., id. at 117–18 (statement of Karl Weikel, American National Cat-
tlemen’s Association). 
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too little factual information.”89 He then expressly refuted the 
claim that “western livestock interests sought to extinguish 
wild horses and burros”90 and went on to state a more nuanced 
position, with a concern for management that balanced protec-
tion for equids with the legitimate interests of ranchers. But 
his explanations fell flat, a fact made evident at the conclusion 
of Mr. Weikel’s remarks when Representative Johnson asked 
whether ranching interests actually “believe in protecting the 
wild horse.”91 
Making matters worse, grazing interests appeared disor-
ganized and disjointed on approaches to the proposed legisla-
tion. The Wyoming Wool Growers Association argued in sup-
port of establishing horse refuges,92 while the National 
Cattlemen’s Association argued adamantly against refuges.93 
The testimony of one witness, who described the viciousness of 
the “wild jackass,” suggested that ranching interests were at a 
loss for dealing with the media frenzy that surrounded the 
push for horse protection.94 
The public had already made up its mind, and legislators 
had clearly taken note. In one observer’s description, the legis-
lators saw the rancher as “a profiteer, intent on using the pub-
lic domain to satisfy his own greed, secretly shooting and 
maiming horses, fencing horses away from water, and general-
ly being an all around bad guy.”95 As if to marginalize rancher 
concerns, the House Subcommittee on Public Lands scheduled 
the testimony of a fourth grader to follow the joint testimony of 
the National Cattlemen’s Association and the National Wool 
Growers Association.96 Unable to find relief in the legislative 
process, the primary users of the public rangelands turned to 
other avenues which are explored in the subsequent parts of 
this Article. 
The ranchers had few friends in Congress who were willing 
to stand up to the sentiment of the WFRHBA supporters. This 
 
 89. Id. at 117. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 128 (question of Rep. Johnson). 
 92. Id. at 131–33 (statement of Robert P. Bledsoe, Executive Secretary, Wyo-
ming Wool Growers Association). 
 93. Id. at 123 (testimony of Karl Weikel). 
 94. Id. at 117, 123. Mr. Weikel’s objections were not limited to the vicious na-
ture of the wild burro, as he went on to explain that “[i]t will be most difficult in 
the Southwest to convince some of our Indian and Spanish people that they can’t 
turn their horses out when they want to.” Id. at 121. 
 95. Pitt, supra note 57, at 513. 
 96. House Hearings, supra note 65, at 142–43. 
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is particularly striking given the prominent role that otherwise 
rancher-friendly western members of Congress played in draft-
ing the statute. The Senate version of the WFRHBA passed 
without dissent on June 29, 1971.97 A House bill with only mi-
nor differences unanimously passed on October 4, 1971.98 Con-
gress reconciled and enacted the law later that year, and Pres-
ident Nixon signed the WFRHBA on December 15, 1971.99 
The new law could not change the fact that wild horses and 
burros “alter the ecosystems by consuming native plants, com-
peting with native mammals such as the Desert Bighorn 
Sheep, fouling springs, and contributing to erosion by wearing 
trails on the steep desert hillsides.”100 Nevertheless, the 
WFRHBA declares that wild equids are “an integral part of the 
natural system of the public lands.”101 The WFRHBA charges 
the Secretary of the Interior with protecting wild horses and 
burros, but at the same time commands the Secretary to man-
age wild equids “in a manner that is designed to achieve and 
maintain a thriving natural ecological balance on the public 
lands.”102 The idea that protecting an invasive species, which 
causes harm to delicate desert ecosystems, could be done in 
such a way as to obtain “thriving natural ecological balance” is 
absurd.103 This general tone of protectionism, rather than bal-
anced management,104 likely is the reason the WFRHBA re-
ceived virtually no support from environmental groups.105 
 
 97. 117 CONG. REC. 22,671 (1971). 
 98. Id. at 34,782. 
 99. Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, Pub. L. No. 92-195, 85 Stat. 
649, 651 (1971); see also H.R. REP. NO. 92-681 (1971) (Conf. Rep.); ENVTL. POLICY 
DIV., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 74-795, REPORT ON PUBLIC LAND POLICY: 
ACTIVITIES IN THE 92D CONGRESS 1–2 (1972). 
 100. Michael L. Wolfe, The Wild Horse and Burro Issue, 1982, 7 ENVTL. REV. 
179, 183 (1983); see also Richard H. Gilluly, The Mustang Controversy, 99 SCI. 
NEWS 219, 220 (1971) (noting that horses compete with mule deer for food and 
that restoring desert big horn sheep populations would require “drastic reduc-
tions” in horse populations). 
 101. 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). 
 102. Id. § 1333 (emphasis added). 
 103. See Wolfe, supra note 100, at 186 (stating that “there is no logic in assign-
ing the maintenance of populations of these non-native and feral animals any 
higher ethical or socio-political priority than that accorded to indigenous wildlife 
species”). 
 104. See Wolfe, supra note 100, at 183. 
 105. The Sierra Club did submit one page of written testimony in support of 
horse protections. House Hearings, supra note 65, at 198–99. Even in light of the 
Act’s shortcomings, environmental groups were wise not to oppose the Act in the 
Kleppe litigation because the Court’s broad endorsement of Congress’s Property 
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Due in part to these flaws, the BLM has struggled to im-
plement the Act. In 1980, BLM estimated the yearly cost to 
administer the Act would reach $40 million.106 Three decades 
later, the annual price tag continues to rise.107 The WFRHBA 
seeks to promote adoption of excess wild horses as an alterna-
tive to slaughter. On average, about half of the WFRHBA’s im-
plementation costs arise from the adoption program, which has 
been such a failure that almost as many horses now dwell in 
BLM holding pens as live in the wild.108 Conditions in the pens 
can be unhealthy for the animals, breeding disease due to over-
crowding.109 The federal government estimates that the public 
rangelands support over 35,000 wild horses, which is about 
10,000 horses in excess of carrying capacity.110 Even with over 
30,000 animals in BLM corrals and pastures, the number of 
wild horses and burros on the rangeland continues to grow.111 
 
Clause power provided a strong foundation for protecting environmental interests 
in federal lands. 
 106. House Hearings, supra note 65, at 183–84. 
 107. Fact Sheet on the BLM’s Management of Livestock Grazing, supra note 31. 
The fiscal year 2010 operating appropriations for the program were $64 million, 
and the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget asks for $76 million. BLM Looking for 
Wild Horse Sanctuaries, PUB. LAND NEWS, Apr. 8, 2011, at 14. 
 108. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-77, BUREAU OF LAND 
MANAGEMENT: EFFECTIVE LONG-TERM OPTIONS NEEDED TO MANAGE 
UNADOPTABLE WILD HORSES 7–8 (2008). Representantive Sam Steiger (R-AZ) 
predicted this consequence in 1971. Discussing the adoption program, he stated: 
“If we talk about gathering and selling them at auction, we are kidding ourselves 
because these animals normally don’t make very good pets unless you want one 
for your mother-in-law with whom you don’t have a particularly good relation-
ship.” House Hearings, supra note 65, at 22; see also Phil Taylor, BLM Announces 
‘New Direction’ for Horse and Burro Program, LAND LETTER, June 10, 2010 [here-
inafter, Taylor, New Direction], http://plc.cylosoftdemo.com/CMDocs 
/PublicLandsCouncil/WILD_HORSES_E&E.pdf (stating that around 70 percent of 
the annual budget for wild horses and burros is spent on animals in BLM corrals 
and pastures). 
 109. Nick Neely, Eligible Mustangs, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Apr. 12, 2010, 
http://www.hcn.org/issues/42.6/eligible-mustangs (describing the BLM adoption 
program); see also Phil Taylor, BLM Facilities Reach Capacity as Herds Boom, 
LAND LETTER, May 14, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/Landletter/2009/05/14/7/ 
[hereinafter, Taylor, Herds Boom] (describing animal rights activists’ displeasure 
with many aspects of the BLM corral program). 
 110. BLM looking for Wild Horse Sanctuaries, supra note 107, at 14. 
 111. See Lyndsey Layton & Juliet Eilperin, Salazar Presents Ambitious Plan to 
Manage Wild Horses; Preserves in Midwest and East, Sterilizations Proposed as 
Population Grows Beyond Control in West, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2009, at A3; Tay-
lor, Herds Boom, supra note 109; Taylor, New Direction, supra note 108 (stating 
that the BLM estimates that herd numbers could grow to 325,000 by year 2021 
without countermeasures). The BLM, on at least one occasion, indicated the need 
to euthanize animals due to overpopulation and the excessive costs of holding the 
animals. Taylor, Herds Boom, supra note 109. 
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The result is overgrazing, soil erosion, and the destruction of 
mule deer, elk, and antelope habitat.112 Amendments to the 
WFRHBA in 1978, part of the Public Rangelands Improvement 
Act,113 were intended to rein in administrative costs and to 
provide more authority for the BLM to combat overpopulation, 
but many of the original problems remain.114 In addition to di-
rect costs, indirect expenses of the Act have come in the form of 
extensive litigation. Over forty cases challenging BLM’s im-
plementation of the Act have made it to the federal courts.115 
II. THE LITIGATION 
Kelley Stephenson was a New Mexico livestock rancher.116 
Pursuant to the Taylor Grazing Act, Stephenson held grazing 
rights to some 8,000 acres of public rangeland.117 Although lit-
tle information exists regarding his personal history, it is clear 
that, like many livestock ranchers, the public rangelands 
played an important role in supporting his operation. Stephen-
son’s grazing allotment included an invaluable desert water 
source known as the Taylor Well.118 In the arid western cli-
 
 112. See, e.g., Taylor, Herds Boom, supra note 109. 
 113. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1908 (2006). In its 1978 statement of national policy, 
Congress reaffirmed the policy of protection, but also addressed the need to “facili-
tat[e] the removal and disposal of excess wild free-roaming horses and burros 
which pose a threat to themselves and their habitat and to other rangeland val-
ues.” Id. § 1901(b)(4). 
 114. Recent proposals by the Obama Administration to address ongoing prob-
lems with the administration of the WFRHBA include: providing additional fund-
ing, relocating herds from the West to midwestern or eastern lands, and increas-
ing the use of infertility drugs and promoting partnerships with private and 
nongovernmental entities. See, e.g., Layton & Eilperin, supra note 111; April 
Reese, Eastward Ho! BLM Proposes New Sanctuaries in More Populated States, 
LAND LETTER, Oct. 15, 2009; DoI Proposes New Preserves as Part of Wild Horse 
Plan, PUB. LAND NEWS, Oct. 16, 2009, at 1; Obama Administration Fashions Mul-
ti-Part Wild Horse Solution, PUB. LAND NEWS, Oct. 13, 2009. 
 115. Kristen H. Glover, Managing Wild Horses on Public Lands: Congressional 
Action and Agency Response, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1108, 1109 (2001); see, e.g., Am. 
Horse Prot. Ass’n v. Watt, 694 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Dahl v. Clark, 600 F. 
Supp. 585 (D. Nev. 1984); Animal Prot. Inst. v. Hodel, 671 F. Supp. 695 (D. Nev. 
1987); see also Richard Symanski, Dances with Horses: Lessons from the Envi-
ronmental Fringe, 10 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 708, 708, 712 (1996) (describing 
certain aspects of one Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros case litigated by the 
Rutgers Law School Animal Rights Law Clinic as “spurious” and “perversely 
counterproductive”). 
 116. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 533 (1976). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. Coincidentally, it was the Taylor Grazing Act under which Stephenson 
acquired his permit to use the allotment. Id. 
2011] STORY OF KLEPPE V. NEW MEXICO 119 
mate, wells are one of the most important assets of a livestock 
operation. Wells are not naturally occurring bodies of water, 
but rather holes dug deep into the ground, from which ground 
water is pumped into a large trough that often resembles a 
plastic children’s swimming pool. Gas or diesel generators usu-
ally run the pumps, which ranchers visit and refuel on a regu-
lar basis. Because of the importance of wells to a livestock op-
eration, as well as the time and labor required to develop and 
maintain them, ranchers guard wells zealously. 
On the first day of February 1974, Stephenson discovered 
several unbranded and unclaimed burros wandering on his pri-
vate land and on the rangelands his cattle were authorized to 
graze.119 Stephenson requested that the BLM remove the bur-
ros because they were eating the feed he put out for his live-
stock and harassing his animals.120 Stephenson may also have 
been concerned that the burros were competing with his live-
stock for access to water at the Taylor Well.121 Regardless, 
BLM made it clear that no removal would occur.122 So, Ste-
phenson turned to state law for relief. He found it in the New 
Mexico Estray Law, which provided the New Mexico Livestock 
Board with the authority to round up and auction: 
[a]ny bovine animal, horse, mule or ass, found running at 
large upon public or private lands, either fenced or un-
fenced, in the state of New Mexico, whose owner is unknown 
in the section where found, or which shall be fifty [50] miles 
or more from the limits of its usual range or pasture, or that 
is branded with a brand which is not on record in the office 
of the cattle sanitary board of New Mexico . . . .123 
The New Mexico Livestock Board is part of the oldest law 
enforcement agency in the state.124 It originally consisted of 
two separate agencies—the Cattle Sanitary Board, founded in 
1887, and the Sheep Sanitary Board, founded in 1889.125 The 
 
 119. New Mexico v. Morton, 406 F. Supp. 1237, 1237 (D.N.M. 1975). 
 120. Id. at 1238. 
 121. Oral Argument at 8:20, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (No. 
74-1488), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_74_1488 
(last visited July 27, 2011). The government stated at oral argument that Ste-
phenson learned of the burros while visiting the local BLM office, which had pho-
tos of the burros standing around the well. Id. at 8:00–9:08. 
 122. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 533 (1976). 
 123. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-14-1 (1966). 
 124. NEW MEXICO LIVESTOCK BOARD, http://www.nmlbonline.com (last visited 
June 25, 2011). 
 125. Id. 
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two agencies merged in 1967 to form the New Mexico Livestock 
Board.126 After passage of and pursuant to the WFRHBA, the 
board entered into a cooperative agreement with the Secretar-
ies of the Interior and Agriculture to implement the Act. Ap-
parently displeased with the results, the board terminated the 
agreement in November 1973.127 
On February 18, 1974, seventeen days after Stephenson’s 
complaint to the BLM, the board rounded up and removed 
nineteen unbranded and unclaimed burros pursuant to the 
New Mexico Estray Law.128 Each burro was seized from federal 
land; none was taken from private land.129 That same day, in 
accordance with usual practice, the Board sold the burros at 
public auction.130 After the sale, the BLM asserted jurisdiction 
under the WFRHBA and “demanded that the [b]oard recover 
the animals and return them to the public lands.”131 The fight 
was on. 
A. New Mexico v. Morton 
In response to the BLM’s demand for the return of the 
seized burros, the State of New Mexico, the New Mexico Live-
stock Board and its director, as well as the purchaser of three 
of the auctioned burros, filed suit in the U.S. District Court in 
Albuquerque.132 The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declarato-
ry relief from the BLM’s demands, arguing that the WFRHBA 
went beyond Congress’s constitutional authority.133 
Representing the plaintiffs was George J. Hopkins, who 
had represented New Mexico with some success just seventeen 
days earlier in another case against the federal government.134 
However, that appears to have been his only prior appearance 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 532–33. 
 128. Id. at 533–34. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 534. 
 131. Id. 
 132. New Mexico v. Morton, 406 F. Supp. 1237 (D.N.M. 1975). 
 133. Id. at 1237–38. 
 134. New Mexico ex rel. Norvell v. Callaway, 389 F. Supp. 821 (D.N.M. 1975) 
(granting only part of the United States’ desired motions to dismiss and for sum-
mary judgment). The case challenged refusal of the commanding general of White 
Sands Missile Range to allow state agents to enter the range to search for a hid-
den treasure that “long-lasting legend” said was located somewhere on a moun-
tain within the Range. Id. at 822. As legend had it, the treasure consisted of “gold 
bars, jewels, and valuable artifacts.” Id. 
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in a federal court. He was an associate in one of New Mexico’s 
most prominent and largest law firms; Modrall, Sperling, 
Roehl, Harris & Sisk.135 Dick Modrall, one of the firm’s foun-
ding partners, was a “cowboy/ranch foreman turned lawyer”136 
who no doubt understood the frustrations of public land gra-
zing. On the other side, representing the federal government, 
was a Harvard educated, seasoned federal litigator named Vic-
tor R. Ortega.137 A native of New Mexico, Ortega had served as 
the U.S. Attorney for the District of New Mexico since 1969, 
representing the federal government in over one hundred ca-
ses.138 
A three-judge panel convened in the U.S. District Court for 
the District of New Mexico to hear the case. This odd judicial 
arrangement was a relic of old federal civil procedure, which 
provided that a permanent injunction restraining the enforce-
ment of an Act of Congress on grounds of unconstitutionality 
should not be granted unless heard and determined by a three-
judge district court.139 The panel consisted of Tenth Circuit 
Judge Oliver Seth, Chief District Judge Harry Vearle Payne, 
and District Judge Edwin L. Mechem.140 The three judges had 
a combined thirty-five years of experience on the bench.141 
Seth, who served as Chief Judge of the Tenth Circuit from 1977 
to 1984, and Mechem were both New Mexico natives, and both 
had worked for the federal government prior to joining the 
bench.142 Judge Payne was born in a Mormon colony in Chi-
 
 135. III MARTINDALE HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 2748B (1975). Modrall, Sper-
ling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk was the second largest firm in Albuquerque, and the 
state, in 1975. Id. at 2725B–2812B. 
 136. Our Story, MODRALL SPERLING LAW FIRM, http://www.modrall.com/firm/ 
our_story (last visited July 26, 2011). 
 137. Morton, 406 F. Supp. at 1237. 
 138. A November 16, 2009 search of Westlaw for cases in which Victor R. Orte-
ga represented the United States yielded 120 cases. See Victor R. Ortega, 
LAWYERS.COM, http://www.lawyers.com/New-Mexico/Santa-Fe/Victor-R.-Ortega-
1139049-a.html (last visited June 25, 2011). 
 139. 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1970) (repealed 1976). 
 140. Morton, 406 F. Supp. at 1237. 
 141. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Seth, Oliver, FED. JUDICIAL 
CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2147&cid=999&ctype=na&instate 
=na (last visited July 26, 2011); Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Payne, 
Harry Vearle, supra, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1854&cid= 
999&ctype=na&instate=na; Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Mechem, 
Edwin Leard, supra, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1608&cid=999 
&ctype=na&instate=na.  
 142. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Seth, Oliver, supra note 141 
(Seth served as an Army Major in World War II); Biographical Directory of Fed-
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huahua, Mexico (just south of New Mexico) and did not go to 
law school, but rather read law.143 
 The three-judge panel turned out to be a godsend for the 
State, dealing it a resounding victory. It was clear that Con-
gress could legislate “all needful Rules and Regulations” con-
cerning public real estate under the Property Clause.144 But 
the court took issue with the idea that wild horses and burros 
could “become ‘property’ of the United States simply by being 
physically present on the ‘territory’ or land of the United 
States.”145 The court’s analysis began with the proposition that 
“the common law, dating back to the Roman law, has been that 
wild animals are owned by the state in its sovereign capacity, 
in trust for the benefit of the people.”146 Reasoning from three 
cases that upheld the power of the federal government to kill 
deer that were damaging federal lands, the court concluded 
that the Property Clause allowed the federal government to 
enact regulations only to protect the public lands from dam-
age.147 Because Congress had provided neither any “finding nor 
any evidence to indicate that wild horses and burros are dam-
aging the public lands,”148 the panel overturned the WFRHBA 
for exceeding the power granted to Congress in the Property 
Clause.149 
However, the district court opinion left considerable room 
for argument on appeal. Congress did, after all, view the feral 
equids as a valued cultural and natural resource whose remov-
al from public lands constituted a harm.150 As born westerners 
(of Mexico and the United States), all three judges likely were 
familiar with ranching and life on the range. Thus, they may 
 
eral Judges: Mechem, Edwin Leard, supra, note 141 (Mechem served as an FBI 
agent during World War II). 
 143. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Payne, Harry Vearle, supra note 
141. “Reading law” was a means by which those who did not go to law school could 
be admitted to the bar. It involved mostly self-teaching but also guidance by an 
experienced attorney or judge. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1377 (9th ed. 2009). 
 144. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3. 
 145. Morton, 406 F. Supp. at 1238. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Morton, 406 F. Supp. at 1239 (citing Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 
(1928)); see also N.M. State Game Comm’n v. Udall, 410 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 
1969); Chalk v. United States, 114 F.2d 207 (4th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 US. 
679 (1941)). 
 148. Morton, 406 F. Supp. at 1239 (citing Hunt, 278 U.S. 96). Of course, feral 
equids do damage to rangeland, but Congress made no such finding because the 
statute sought to protect them. 
 149. Id. 
 150. 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). 
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have had difficulty seeing the ecological findings as Congress 
intended.151 They likely understood the WFRHBA to promote, 
rather than prohibit, damage to the rangelands. This cultural 
context may help explain why the panel made such an im-
portant ruling on the constitutionality of a federal statute in 
only a two-page memorandum opinion. 
B. Kleppe v. New Mexico 
The United States appealed the decision invalidating the 
WFRHBA directly to the U.S. Supreme Court, which noted 
probable jurisdiction in 1975.152 Then, as now, federal law 
permitted appeal of a three-judge district court decision direct-
ly to the Supreme Court.153 The stage was set for a dramatic 
showdown in Washington. 
While the case was on appeal, President Ford nominated 
then-Secretary of the Interior Rogers Morton, the named de-
fendant in the case and former chairman of the Republican Na-
tional Committee, to serve as Commerce Secretary.154 Thomas 
S. Kleppe, a Republican congressman from North Dakota, re-
placed Morton as Secretary of the Interior.155 Kleppe was not 
known as a champion of wildlife protection—he entered office 
approving oil drilling off the Southern California coast and left 
office promoting the same on Alaska’s North Slope.156 Never-
theless, federal prerogatives were at stake in the case, and the 
transition at the Interior did not alter the course or substance 
of the United States’ appeal. 
The appeal gained the attention of Wyoming, Idaho, and 
Nevada,157 which realized that much more was at stake than 
the seized burros.158 Abandoned horse and estray laws, which 
 
 151. Id. (finding wild horses are an “integral part of the natural system of the 
public lands”). 
 152. Sec’y of the Interior v. New Mexico, 423 U.S. 818 (1975). 
 153. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2006). 
 154. Rogers Morton, Official in Nixon, Ford Cabinets, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, 
Apr. 20, 1979, at 12. 
 155. Matt Schudel, Thomas Kleppe, 87; Interior Secretary During Mid-1970s, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/03/03/AR2007030301196.html. 
 156. Id. To Secretary Kleppe’s credit, several of his decisions, such as banning 
the use of lead shot in waterfowl hunting, were environmentally noteworthy. Id. 
 157. See infra notes 182–202 and accompanying text. 
 158. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae State of Idaho, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 
426 U.S. 529 (1976) (No. 74-1488), 1974 WL 175952 at *3 [hereinafter Idaho Brief] 
(“In this case, much, much more is at issue than the validity of the Wild Free-
Roaming Horse and Burro Act.”). 
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existed in almost every western state,159 would be preempted 
by conflicting provisions of the WFRHBA.160 Moreover, a state 
victory would restore the dominant priority ranchers had en-
joyed in their competition with feral equids for scarce range-
land resources. A loss, the states feared, would open the door 
“for eventual and complete erosion of any state jurisdiction . . . 
on federally-owned lands.”161 For Nevada in particular, which 
had the largest population of estrays and the second highest 
proportion of federal land ownership, the stakes were high.162 
Although New Mexico served as a plaintiff in the litigation, 
Nevada led the charge for the Sagebrush Rebellion,163 ad-
vancing arguments for states’ and ranchers’ interests that 
would live on long after the resolution of Kleppe. 
1. The Briefs 
The parties’ briefs alone foreshadow the outcome of the 
case. The United States asserted that the power of Congress 
under the Property Clause to protect feral equids is “beyond 
any reasonable doubt.”164 The only restrictions on Congress’s 
powers under the Property Clause, the United States argued, 
are that the actions must be “needful” and “respecting” federal 
land.165 Within those constraints, the Property Clause provides 
 
 159. See sources cited supra note 65. 
 160. Wyoming worried that “without the provisions of the State Estray laws 
relative to capture and control of such animals, the local rancher or farmer finds 
himself without an effective remedy to prevent disease and/or damage to his live-
stock.” See Brief of Amici Curiae State of Wyoming Wyoming Livestock Board, 
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (No. 74-1488), 1976 WL 181209 at *5 
(Feb. 17, 1976) [hereinafter Wyoming Brief]. Nevada lamented that if the 
WFRHBA survived, “Nevada’s control of estrays would be emasculated.” Brief of 
Amici Curiae Nevada State Board of Agriculture Central Committee of Nevada 
State Grazing Boards, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (No. 74-1488), 
1975 WL 173619 at *4 (Aug. 18, 1975) [hereinafter Nevada Board Brief]. 
 161. Idaho Brief, supra note 158, at *3; see also Nevada Board Brief, supra 
note 160, at *4–5; Wyoming Brief, supra note 160, at *5. 
 162. Nevada Board Brief, supra note 160, at *4–5. 
 163. MICHAEL W. BOWERS, THE SAGEBRUSH STATE: NEVADA’S HISTORY, 
GOVERNMENT, AND POLITICS 134 (2006). Former Utah Governor Scott Matheson 
described Nevada as assuming leadership of the rebellion. Scott M. Matheson, Re-
bels Defied Federal Land Dominance, DESERET NEWS, Sept. 22, 1986, at 1A, 4A. 
 164. Brief for the Secretary of the Interior, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 
(1976) (No. 74-1488), 1975 WL 173620 at *15 (Dec. 1, 1975) [hereinafter Interior 
Brief]. 
 165. Id. at *17. 
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Congress with “what are essentially police powers to protect 
and preserve the natural resources of the public lands.”166 
New Mexico could not muster a persuasive response to the 
United States’ arguments. New Mexico argued for a very lim-
ited scope of the Property Clause, framing the issue as whether 
feral equids “are a part of the federal soil.”167 In addition to its 
narrow interpretation of “property,” New Mexico asserted that 
only harm-avoiding regulations are “needful,”168 and that Con-
gress erroneously found that equids were at risk of harm.169 
Perhaps most detrimental to New Mexico’s case,170 it acknowl-
edged that the burros at issue were seized on BLM lands,171 
though New Mexico nevertheless maintained that the burros 
spent “the majority of their time on private land.”172 In the de-
bate over the extent of Congress’s authority under the Property 
Clause, New Mexico appeared outmatched. 
Eleven amicus briefs were filed: four supporting the United 
States, six opposing, and one taking a mixed position. In sup-
port of the federal government the American Horse Protection 
Association,173 the International Association of Game, Fish, 
and Conservation Commissioners,174 the Humane Society,175 
an author and wild horse conservationist named Hope Ry-
 
 166. Id. at *11. 
 167. Answer Brief for the State of New Mexico, et al., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 
426 U.S. 529 (1976) (No. 74-1488), 1976 WL 181207 at *9 (Jan. 19, 1976) [herein-
after New Mexico Brief]; see also id. at *15 (arguing that “horses and burros do 
not constitute real property”). 
 168. New Mexico Brief, supra note 167, at *8. 
 169. Id. at *10–11.  
 170. See infra notes 231–42 and accompanying text. 
 171. New Mexico Brief, supra note 167, at *4. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Brief of American Horse Protection Ass’n, Amicus Curiae, in Support of 
Appellant, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (No. 74-1488), 1975 WL 
173616 (May 30, 1975) [hereinafter AHPA Brief]. 
 174. Brief of Amicus Curiae, International Ass’n of Game, Fish and Conserva-
tion Commissioners, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (No. 74-1488), 
1975 WL 173617 (Aug. 13, 1975). The Association argued that the WFRHBA was 
within Congress’s Property Clause authority because feral animals are not wild-
life, and therefore not within the management responsibility of the states. Id. at 
*5–7. In this respect the Association supported the United States. However, the 
Association also opposed the United States by arguing for a narrow interpretation 
of the Property Clause. Id. at *12. In this respect, the Association’s position was 
mixed. 
 175. Brief of Amicus Curiae the Humane Society of the United States, Kleppe 
v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (No. 74-1488), 1975 WL 173622 (Nov. 19, 
1975). 
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den,176 and Wild Horse Organized Assistance, Inc.177 filed ami-
cus briefs. They argued, among other things, that the holding 
of the court below jeopardized “[p]ast and future legislation en-
acted pursuant to the Territory and Property Clause establish-
ing national forests and public parks and providing protection 
for wildlife therein.”178 
The United States also worried that the trial court’s nar-
row interpretation of the Property Clause might seriously un-
dermine federal agencies’ ability to manage the public lands. 
The Justice Department’s brief noted that the very permit au-
thorizing Stephenson to graze his cattle on public land could be 
unconstitutional if the Property Clause allowed Congress to act 
only on harm-avoidance grounds.179 Other routine public land 
management activities, such as the manipulation of elk popula-
tions in the National Elk Refuge, would be difficult to justify 
under the terms of the lower court’s ruling.180 Moreover, the 
boundary between avoiding harm and producing benefits is no-
toriously muddled, and has vexed takings law for decades.181 
Applying the harm-avoidance principle to police congressional 
compliance with the Property Clause would invite endless liti-
gious mischief. 
Among the amici supporting the State of New Mexico were 
the Nevada State Board of Agriculture,182 the Nevada Central 
Committee of Grazing Boards,183 the Pacific Legal Founda-
 
 176. Brief of Amicus Curiae Hope Ryden, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 
(1976) (No. 74-1488), 1975 WL 173621 (Nov. 17, 1975). Ms. Ryden also testified at 
length in the hearings that led to the passage of the WFRHBA. See, e.g., House 
Hearings, supra note 65, at 134–42. 
 177. Brief of Amicus Curiae Wild Horse Organized Assistance, Inc., Kleppe v. 
New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (No. 74-1488), 1975 WL 173624 (Nov. 20, 1975). 
 178. E.g., AHPA Brief, supra note 173, at *8. 
 179. Interior Brief, supra note 164, at *18. 
 180. See Robert L. Fischman & Angela King, Savings Clauses and Trends in 
Natural Resources Federalism, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 129, 131–
41 (2007) (discussing elk management controversy in the refuge, and its conflict 
between Wyoming and the United States). 
 181. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024–27 (1992) 
(“[T]he distinction between ‘harm-preventing’ and ‘benefit-conferring’ regulation is 
often in the eye of the beholder.”). 
 182. Brief of Amicus Curiae Nevada State Board of Agriculture, Kleppe v. New 
Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (No. 74-1488), 1975 WL 173627 (Jan. 2, 1975). 
 183. Brief of Amicus Curiae Nevada State Board of Agriculture Central Com-
mittee of Nevada State Grazing Boards, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 
(1976) (No. 74-1488), 1975 WL 173619 (Aug. 18, 1975). 
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tion,184 the State of Idaho,185 and the Wyoming Livestock 
Board.186 The states took a shotgun approach to the case, at-
tacking the WFRHBA on every conceivable front, while at the 
same time defending against the argument that the holding be-
low would threaten other environmental legislation.187 Nevada, 
for example, claimed that the “ ‘parade of horribles’ just cannot 
be supported in the law”188 because the constitutional infirmity 
is unique to the WFRHBA. Specifically, Nevada argued that 
other environmental laws, such as the National Wildlife Refuge 
System Act189 and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act,190 were 
“self-cleansing—they contain either specific language ruling 
against such confrontation with State fish and game laws, or 
they are easily distinguished.”191 
The Pacific Legal Foundation, founded just two years ear-
lier, made essentially the same points as New Mexico.192 Idaho, 
on the other hand, took a more extreme position and attacked 
the idea of protecting the horses and burros as “absurd.”193 
Idaho’s Attorney General, Warren Felton, offered the following 
alternative to the Act: 
Rather than preserve degenerate estrays, it is better to look 
backward to that which once was, and cease thinking of 
perpetuating that which does not exist. Texas has the idea. 
Build a statue to the horse that used to be, make it life size, 
include a stallion, some mares, and a few colts. Let this 
bronze symbol stand in a public place so that generations 
that are to come may see the type of horse that contributed 
the base stock to the Western range horse industry. And on 
this statue carve a caption taken from a letter to Life pro-
testing the destruction of the wild horse herds in recent 
years: “Son, that is what was once known as the Western 
 
 184. Brief of Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appel-
lees, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (No. 74-1488), 1975 WL 173626 
(Aug. 14, 1975) [hereinafter PLF Brief]. 
 185. Idaho Brief, supra note 158. 
 186. Wyoming Brief, supra note 160. 
 187. See, e.g., Nevada Board Brief, supra note 160, at *11. 
 188. Id. at *9. 
 189. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd, ee (2006). 
 190. 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (2006). 
 191. Nevada Board Brief, supra note 160, at *11. 
 192. PLF Brief, supra note 184. The Foundation would later play an important 
role in the political movements spawned in reaction to the environmental legisla-
tion of the 1970s, especially in defending private property owners harmed by regu-
lation. See Environmental Regulation Cases, PAC. LEGAL FOUND., 
http://www.pacificlegal.org/page.aspx?pid=270 (last visited July 26, 2011). 
 193. Idaho Brief, supra note 158, at *5. 
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pony.”194 
Certainly this position was inconsistent with the broad 
public sentiment that led Congress to pass the Act,195 and it 
can perhaps be best explained as evidence of just how frustrat-
ed western states had become in trying to deal with the in-
creasing dominance of federal control of the public rangelands. 
In this regard, these arguments foreshadowed a looming politi-
cal rebellion. The Wyoming Livestock Board, on the other 
hand, offered no novel position and merely adopted the position 
of the State of New Mexico and the Nevada State Board of Ag-
riculture.196 
The case was of particular interest to Nevada, because it 
had been making the same argument as New Mexico—that the 
WFRHBA is unconstitutional and that wild and free-roaming 
equids belong to the states—in a separate controversy.197 Fur-
thermore, Nevada’s ability to control horses on the public lands 
was of special import because the federal government owns 
such a large proportion of its land area, more than 80 per-
cent.198 Nevada thus saw the Act as interfering with its police 
powers, arguing that “Nevada should be able to control estrays, 
diseased animals, fish and game and promote range manage-
ment within the boundaries of Nevada. Should these obvious 
rights under the State’s police powers be stripped, state sover-
eignty is necessarily questioned.”199 Robert List, Nevada’s At-
torney General, hence asserted that if the Act were upheld, 
Wyoming, Nevada, and New Mexico “will have been admitted 
into the Union, not as an equal member, but as one shorn of a 
legislative power vested in all the other States of the Union, a 
power resulting from the fact of statehood and incident to its 
 
 194. Id. at *5 (quoting WALKER D. WYMAN, THE WILD HORSE OF THE WEST 
(1962)) (emphasis added). 
 195. One author captured this sentiment by describing the wild horse as fol-
lows: “ ‘[t]he most beautiful, the most spirited and the most inspiring creature ev-
er to print foot on the grasses of America.’ ” Richard H. Gilluly, The Mustang Con-
troversy, 99 SCI. NEWS 219, 220 (1971) (quoting author J. Frank Dobie). 
 196. Wyoming Brief, supra note 160. Wyoming instead chose to illustrate the 
factual circumstances of free roaming equids in Wyoming. 
 197. SYMANSKI, supra note 63, at 129 (Nevada’s State Agricultural Director 
impounded eighty wild horses rounded up by BLM, claiming that the Act was un-
constitutional and that the horses belonged to the state). This controversy even-
tually came before the courts in American Horse Prot. Ass’n v. Frizzell, 403 F. 
Supp. 1206 (D. Nev. 1975), but the State did not raise the issues of state owner-
ship and the constitutionality of the Act. 
 198. See infra note 273 and accompanying text. 
 199. Brief for Nevada State Board of Agriculture, supra note 182, at *12. 
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plenary existence.”200 Again, the states’ arguments suggested 
something of greater political consequence than the mere man-
agement of wild horses. The equal footing argument, which 
would remain a complaint of Nevada’s for many years,201 as 
well as the states’ other arguments concerning the Tenth 
Amendment and state police powers,202 began to frame a public 
lands conflict that would long outlive the Kleppe dispute. 
2. The Argument 
Deputy solicitor general and adjunct professor of law at 
Georgetown, Arthur Raymond Randolph, Jr., represented the 
United States before the Supreme Court.203 He graduated at 
the top of his class from the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School and is now a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit.204 Apparently New Mexico was 
impressed with Randolph’s performance, for he later served the 
state as Special Assistant Attorney General from 1985 to 1990. 
Given its success in the district court, New Mexico stuck 
with Modrall Sperling to advocate for its interests before the 
Supreme Court. For this task, the firm called on veteran litiga-
tor George T. Harris, Jr., a former president of the New Mexico 
Bar Association,205 who had twice before unsuccessfully repre-
sented New Mexico as a special assistant attorney general in 
petitions for certiorari to the Court.206 
Oral arguments took place on March 23, 1976, and Deputy 
Solicitor Randolph performed brilliantly. From the outset, 
members of the Court challenged Randolph to define the limits 
of Congress’s Property Clause power, questioning whether 
Congress could protect wild equids on private land.207 Ran-
dolph explained that protecting horses and burros on private 
 
 200. Id. at *13 (citing Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896)). 
 201. See infra text accompanying notes 303–10. 
 202. See, e.g., Idaho Brief, supra note 158, at *2; New Mexico Brief, supra note 
167, at *12–13; Wyoming Brief, supra note 160, at *5. 
 203. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Randolph, Arthur Raymond, 
supra note 141, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1964&cid=999&ctype= 
na&instate=na. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Past Presidents, N.M. BAR ASS’N, http://www.nmbar.org/ 
AboutSBNM/Governance/pastpresidents.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2009). 
 206. See N.M. State Game Comm’n v. Hickel, 396 U.S. 961 (1969); N.M. State 
Game Comm’n v. U.S. Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit, 396 U.S. 953 (1969). 
 207. Oral Argument at 3:09, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (No. 
74-1488), available at www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_74_1488. 
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land was not at issue in the case because New Mexico had 
seized the burros on public, not private, land.208 Justice Ste-
vens was not easily persuaded, referring to the trial court’s 
opinion which stated that “[t]he controversy involved here be-
gan when a New Mexico rancher . . . discovered several un-
branded and unclaimed burros wandering on his private land . 
. . and also on public land.”209 Randolph held his ground, argu-
ing that regardless of the language of the district court opinion, 
Congress’s power to protect wild horses and burros on private 
land was not at issue.210 
Randolph analogized the case to Light v. United States,211 
one of the seminal Supreme Court decisions establishing feder-
al natural resource management authority over public lands.212 
He argued that if Congress could restrict access to the public 
lands then so too could Congress prohibit harm to animals liv-
ing on the public lands.213 He also likened the WFRHBA to the 
sixth century Justinian right of a landowner to prevent others 
from killing animals on his land.214 Randolph noted that the 
WFRHBA passed both houses of Congress unanimously and 
the governor of Nevada, the state with the largest population of 
wild equids, wrote letters to both the Senate and the House ex-
pressing support for the Act.215 
 
 208. Id. at 5:18. 
 209. Id. at 29:40–32:05; see also Morton, supra note 119, at 1237. 
 210. Oral Argument, supra note 207, at 30:10. One vexing problem with the 
Kleppe story is explaining why New Mexico chose the Stephenson case instead of 
waiting for the federal government to use its WFRHBA authority to protect ani-
mals at the time they were roaming on private land. Such facts would have made 
a better challenge to the Property Clause authority of the United States than the 
Stephenson circumstances, where the New Mexico Livestock Board rounded up 
the animals on BLM land. However, the federal enforcement authorities were 
loath to preempt state estray laws on private land, so no opportunity would likely 
arise for the state to have chosen the more favorable fact pattern. 
  Similarly, Stephenson could have sought mandamus to force the BLM to 
act with dispatch to remove wild horses on his private lands. While that tactic 
was successful in the courts, see, e.g., Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 799 
F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1986), it does not raise the grand constitutional issues that 
rally movements.  
 211. 220 U.S. 523 (1911); see also the companion case to Light, United States v. 
Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911). 
 212. Oral Argument, supra note 207, at 20:45. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 19:40. 
 215. Near the end of the argument the bench signaled its view that the issues 
at stake were minimal. One Justice stated that Randolph probably drew straws 
for this case. Randolph answered, “[a]nd I lost,” to which the Justices responded 
with laughter. Id. at 25:45. 
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George Harris was outmatched. He conceded that the bur-
ros at issue were not seized on private land, which opened the 
door to an onslaught of challenges.216 Time and again, the Jus-
tices questioned how New Mexico could have standing to bring 
arguments about Congress’s power to protect wild equids on 
private land given Harris’s concession that the burros at issue 
were not seized on private land.217 Harris was without re-
sponse, stating at one point: “I’m sorry, I’m not sure I’m follow-
ing here.”218 
3. The Decision 
On June 17, 1976, in one of two unanimous opinions writ-
ten by Justice Marshall and issued that day,219 the Supreme 
Court handed the western states a crushing defeat. Summarily 
dismissing New Mexico’s arguments, the Court reached back to 
a long line of cases endorsing broad federal resource manage-
ment to declare that “ ‘[t]he power over the public land thus en-
trusted to Congress is without limitations.’ ”220 
The Court unpacked the lawsuit into four main issues: (1) 
the scope of the challenge to the WFRHBA; (2) the breadth of 
federal power authorized by the Property Clause; (3) the dis-
tinction between the Property Clause and the Enclave Clause; 
and (4) the division of jurisdiction between the state and feder-
al government on public land. These issues closely track the 
four sections of the Court’s opinion. 
Narrowly defining the constitutional issues raised by the 
WFRHBA, the Court proceeded on the basis that the dispute 
concerned only federal authority over wildlife on public lands. 
Though the protection of the Act extends to horses and burros 
on either public or private land,221 the state’s counsel had 
acknowledged at oral argument that the roaming burros were 
rounded up on public land.222 The Court therefore reserved the 
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more troublesome and inflammatory issue of federal authority 
over private land, stating: “[W]e do not think it appropriate . . . 
to determine the extent, if any, to which the Property Clause 
empowers Congress to protect animals on private lands or the 
extent to which such regulation is attempted by the Act.”223 
With the scope of the state’s challenge so cabined, the 
Court held that the WFRHBA as applied to public land falls 
within congressional authority under the Property Clause. The 
state’s construction of the Property Clause purported to limit 
federal authority to (1) “the power to dispose of and make inci-
dental rules regarding use of federal property; and (2) the pow-
er to protect federal property,” meaning the land itself.224 New 
Mexico argued that the WFRHBA’s wildlife protection extend-
ed beyond the boundaries of the Property Clause because it 
failed to protect the realty itself. This is the essence of the dis-
trict court’s opinion in New Mexico v. Morton.225 
Rejecting New Mexico’s “narrow reading” of the Property 
Clause as inconsistent with a long line of case law, the Court 
endorsed an “expansive reading” of the clause.226 Kleppe reiter-
ated that congressional power over the public lands is “without 
limitations.”227 While it does not possess a general police pow-
er, “Congress exercises the powers both of a proprietor and of a 
legislature over the public domain,”228 which “necessarily in-
cludes the power to regulate and protect the wildlife living 
there.”229 
Arguing that the WFRHBA was not based on science and 
actually harms the public lands, New Mexico attempted to 
prompt the Court to question the empirical connection between 
the terms of the law and the aims of the Property Clause. In a 
footnote dismissal, the Court declined the invitation to “re-
weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of 
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Congress.”230 Courts inevitably will decide challenges to stat-
utes passed pursuant to the Property Clause, but the standard 
of review will be lenient, as exemplified in Kleppe. Thus, Kleppe 
signals that the Court will rely primarily on the political pro-
cess to place limits on the exercise of the Property Clause.231 
The Kleppe opinion also made clear that the Property 
Clause is a stand-alone basis for federal authority on public 
lands. New Mexico relied on the Enclave Clause to argue that 
the federal government could not supplant state police power 
under the New Mexico Estray Law without first obtaining the 
state’s consent.232 The Constitution’s Enclave Clause is a sepa-
rate source of federal authority for certain enumerated purpos-
es,233 which requires state consent for the transfer of jurisdic-
tion. The state can cede exclusive or partial jurisdiction to the 
federal government, thereby extinguishing state police power 
over the land to the extent such power is transferred.234 Under 
the Property Clause, in contrast, no state consent is necessary. 
The Court held that the federal government possesses pre-
emptive jurisdiction over the public domain under the Property 
Clause even if it does not secure jurisdiction under the Enclave 
Clause.235 
In response to the state’s claims that the WFRHBA intrud-
ed upon sovereign police powers, the Court stated that “[t]he 
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Act does not establish exclusive federal jurisdiction over the 
public lands in New Mexico; it merely overrides the New Mexi-
co Estray Law insofar as the state agency attempts to regulate 
federally protected animals.”236 Congress and the states exer-
cise concurrent, not mutually exclusive, jurisdiction over the 
public domain. To the extent that the laws of each conflict, fed-
eral law is supreme and preempts inconsistent state law. De-
spite New Mexico’s lamentations, the states retain considerable 
authority over public lands in the absence of federal legislation 
or regulation. Indeed, the states retain “broad trustee and po-
lice powers over wild animals within their jurisdictions.”237 
This may be little solace to the states—exercising power only to 
the extent the federal government has not acted—but it is not 
insignificant or unconstitutional. 
Thus, Kleppe slammed the door shut on challenges to fed-
eral control of the public rangelands.238 The decision undoubt-
edly “sharpened the ranching community’s attention to the fin-
er points of constitutional law,”239 while leaving Nevada to 
wonder what to make of its equal-footing claim. 
Although Kleppe was unanimous, the papers of Justice 
Marshall suggest that there was some debate among the Jus-
tices. The trove of Marshall materials contains a cryptic note 
from Chief Justice Burger regarding Kleppe v. New Mexico, 
dated a few days before the Court issued its judgment: 
[The] enthusiasm that the rancher-water Justices exhibited 
for my scholarly analysis of the grazing problems leads me 
to abandon the idea of separate writing. I assumed ranchers 
would want to be free to shoot trespassing burros but if By-
ron [White] and Bill Rehnquist want to put wild burros on a 
new form of “welfare” I will submit. In short, I join you.240 
While the “ranchers” on the Court endorsed Justice Mar-
shall’s opinion, the Kleppe decision inflamed the public land 
ranchers in the West. The following part explores the Sage-
brush Rebellion that resulted. 
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III. THE SAGEBRUSH REBELLION 
Federal ownership of western lands powerfully shapes the 
regional economy and society. Along with aridity, it is perhaps 
the defining characteristic of the West.241 Though a national 
park can be a source of pride, most federal land ownership (es-
pecially BLM jurisdiction) “has always been a politically attrac-
tive whipping boy for western politicians.”242 Federal proprie-
tary control and relatively unproductive rangelands prompted 
the Kleppe controversy; it should be no surprise that the Su-
preme Court decision did not quell the “disaffection with na-
tional government”243 that permeated western states. Indeed, it 
helped propel a political response that grew in importance up 
to and through the election of self-identified “sagebrush rebel,” 
Ronald Reagan.244 
The Sagebrush Rebellion began as narrowly focused 
rancher frustration with the WFRHBA, and in less than half a 
decade grew to encompass a wide array of public land conflicts. 
After the crushing defeat of Kleppe, Nevada grabbed the baton 
and led the movement for greater state control of public lands, 
advancing a regional political agenda. As Nevada pressed for-
ward, Congress enacted a more comprehensive public range-
lands management reform statute. That legislation helped 
draw more stakeholders into the rebellion. 
This Part focuses on two statutes that fomented subse-
quent conflicts over federal natural resources, further stoking 
the Sagebrush Rebellion. The first is the 1976 Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act,245 which helped spread western 
disgruntlement beyond ranchers in the wake of Kleppe. The 
statute provided special avenues for states to influence federal 
public land management through cooperative federalism, and 
its implementation neglected to significantly change the extent 
of grazing on public lands. Nonetheless, it sparked more west-
ern grievances. The second statute is the 1979 Nevada law as-
serting proprietary control over federal public lands.246 That 
law inspired other states to enact similar declarations. Histori-
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an Patricia Limerick identifies the Nevada statute as the open-
ing salvo of the Sagebrush Rebellion,247 but the legislation’s 
roots extend to the WFRHBA and discontent with Kleppe. This 
Part concludes with a description of Nevada’s failed judicial 
challenge to the 1976 Act, punctuating another cycle in the de-
velopment of the Sagebrush Rebellion, which continued to feed 
on discontent generated, in part, from judicial losses. The story 
of these legal developments following Kleppe highlights “un-
cooperative federalism” as a key strategy of western states re-
sisting federal limitations on longstanding public land users. 
A. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
Even as the litigation over the WFRHBA wound down, 
Congress considered a score of bills to reduce overgrazing and 
bring a more systematic approach to management of the unre-
served public lands, which had not yet been removed from the 
disposal laws facilitating privatization.248 On October 21, 1976, 
four months after the Court issued the opinion in Kleppe, Con-
gress passed the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(FLPMA).249 After decades of administrative drift, FLPMA 
provided the BLM with organic legislation, a comprehensive 
legislative charter for the largest public land system in the 
United States.250 Although FLPMA retained much of the Tay-
lor Grazing Act and so stopped short of a thorough overhaul of 
the law of livestock grazing,251 it dramatically shifted the cen-
ter of gravity in land management on public lands. The FLPMA 
brought comprehensive, pluralistic planning to the BLM.252 It 
imposed on the public rangelands the multiple-use, sustained-
yield rubric,253 which had been the guiding legislative mandate 
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of the national forests since 1960.254 This shift in legislative 
policy meant that grazing no longer claimed dominant status 
on the rangelands.255 Indeed, FLPMA placed new environmen-
tal restrictions on BLM authority, including limits on grazing 
that caused unnecessary and undue degradation.256 Now 
ranchers would have to compete not only with wild horses and 
burros, but also with anyone else who wanted to use the public 
lands, including recreationists and environmentalists. In addi-
tion to providing the BLM with expansive rangeland manage-
ment authority, including the ability to designate and regulate 
areas of critical environmental concern,257 FLPMA explicitly 
affirmed that “the public lands [will] be retained in Federal 
ownership.”258 Frustrations boiled over again, and the combi-
nation of Kleppe and FLPMA prompted the coalescence of a po-
litical movement to limit federal management that reduced the 
influence of ranchers and other traditional users of the public 
lands: the “Sagebrush Rebellion.”259 
Some commentators date the start of the Sagebrush Rebel-
lion as late as 1979.260 Most mark the passage of FLPMA in 
1976 as the triggering event.261 This story of Kleppe supports 
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an earlier origin: the enactment of the 1971 WFRHBA.262 The 
WFRHBA was the first congressional enactment reforming 
public land law in the modern environmental era. Kleppe was 
the first in a line of lawsuits lashing back at the modern 
framework of allocating scarce public natural resources. 
Of course, dating the start of any political movement en-
tails some arbitrary line drawing. Professor Goble describes 
antecedents to the Sagebrush Rebellion that date back to Ten-
nessee’s 1799 claim to the public domain within its borders.263 
In 1955, the western commentator, Bernard DeVoto, identified 
interest groups supporting a version of “home rule which 
means basically that we want federal help without federal reg-
ulation.”264 From this perspective, the Sagebrush Rebellion is a 
modern efflorescence of a perennial public-land state com-
plaint. The Sagebrush Rebellion is a recent chapter written out 
of frustration with the legislation of the 1970s.265 
Former Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt, as promi-
nent an opponent of the Sagebrush Rebellion as any the West 
has produced, cautioned that: 
It is easy to dismiss the motives of the small group of 
stockmen and their political allies who have revived the ral-
lying cry of states’ rights for their own benefit. But the con-
siderable support that the Sagebrush Rebellion has gained 
in the West reflects a deep-seated frustration with . . . fed-
eral regulation of public lands. Many westerners share 
growing dissatisfaction with the way federal lands are man-
aged. . . . As the fastest growing region in the country, the 
West cannot afford to be unable to plan its future develop-
ment.266 
Congress (especially through the committees that drafted 
FLPMA, which were dominated by westerners) responded to 
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the legitimate western state claims of a special interest in pub-
lic rangelands. It peppered FLPMA with several provisions in-
viting states to influence federal management through the tools 
of cooperative federalism.267 The BLM resource management 
plans, in particular, must be attentive to state and local man-
agement goals.268 The legislation promotes consistency in 
planning between levels of government.269 But the Sagebrush 
Rebellion had little patience for jumping through the hoops to 
qualify for FLPMA consideration. What distinguished the 
Sagebrush Rebellion from other efforts to promote traditional 
and local economic interests was its rejection of cooperative 
federalism. Instead, the rebellion chose to push what we call 
“un-cooperative federalism.”270 
The following two subparts show how Nevada led the 
charge to advance the Sagebrush Rebellion by employing “un-
cooperative federalism,” first in state legislation challenging 
federal control of public lands and second in litigation seeking 
to overturn FLPMA. 
B. Nevada’s Assembly Bill 413 
Recall that New Mexico had not been alone in its fight with 
the federal government. In its brief to the Supreme Court, New 
Mexico had urged the Court to consider briefs filed by other 
western states, including Nevada, Idaho, and Wyoming.271 Ne-
vada had expressed particular interest in the issue, with its 
Board of Agriculture filing three separate amicus briefs.272 Like 
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its fellow amici in the Kleppe litigation, Nevada contains sub-
stantial amounts of federally-owned land.273 
From the perspective of these states, federal legislation 
like the FLPMA and the WFRBHA were burdens unfairly im-
posed by Washington outsiders who knew little about life on 
the range.274 The general sentiment was that “the policy arena 
was distinctly biased in favor of environmental values.”275 Such 
sentiments arose for a variety of reasons, including the fact 
that the BLM’s only effective tool for managing horse and burro 
populations in accordance with the law was to reduce livestock 
grazing allotments.276 But what fundamentally stoked the re-
bellion was the ranchers’ loss of control over federal lands. Un-
til the WFRBHA, “overt competition for use of specific areas of 
public lands” was rare, and local ranchers held sway over 
rangelands.277 And, as the comments of one Nevada jurist re-
flect, the ends of federal policies sometimes appeared dubious 
from a westerner’s perspective: “Congress bought into political-
ly correct, ecologically buffoonish arguments and tried to create 
a national symbol out of the inbred great grandson of some-
body’s plow horse.”278 Thus, many westerners concluded that 
federal environmental legislation was nothing more than “a 
ploy of an upper-class elite that wanted to preserve its pristine 
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playground at the expense of those who needed to use the na-
tion’s resources for survival.”279 
Frustrated by Congress and rebuffed by the courts, Nevada 
reasserted the traditional, pre-WFRHBA influence over the 
public rangelands through “un-cooperative federalism” involv-
ing direct challenges to federal authority. The Nevada legisla-
ture began studying public land policy reform in 1975,280 while 
Kleppe was on appeal. Decrying the “uneven quality and some-
times arbitrary and capricious” nature of federal land man-
agement and its effects on livestock and mining, the Nevada 
legislature directed its commission to explore how to secure 
greater control over public lands through federal political and 
judicial processes.281 Six months after the Kleppe decision, the 
commission reported to the legislature.282 Referring to Kleppe, 
the legislative counsel advised the commission that due to “the 
machinations of the Supreme Court,”283 Nevada had no legal 
claim to the public lands.284 The counsel complained similarly 
of Congress.285 Nonetheless, the commission saw political value 
in pursuing additional litigation “to reinforce other arguments . 
. . involving federal-state controversies.”286 In this regard, Ne-
vada recognized that even unsuccessful litigation could play an 
important role in furthering the agenda of increasing state in-
fluence over federal resource management. Because the com-
mission completed its findings before the passage of FLPMA,287 
the legislative counsel’s complaint against Congress may be 
traced to the WFRHBA. 
In response to the commission’s report, the legislature cre-
ated the Select Committee on Public Lands in 1977 to rally 
support for state control of public lands.288 The six Nevada 
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58th Sess., at 3 (Dec. 1976). 
 283. Id. at 65. 
 284. Id. at 16. 
 285. Id. at 65. 
 286. Id. at 16. 
 287. Id. at 24–25. 
 288. A Guide to the Records of Sagebrush Rebellion Collection No. 85-04, U. OF 
NEV., RENO, MATHEWSON-IGT KNOWLEDGE CENTER, http://www.knowledgecenter 
.unr.edu/specoll/mss/85-04.html (last updated June 22, 2008). The Select Commit-
tee was, at the time, unique in the annals of the Nevada legislature. NEV. LEGIS. 
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lawmakers appointed to the Committee pushed forward As-
sembly Bill 413, now known as the Sagebrush Rebellion Bill.289 
The Bill passed the sixty-member Nevada legislature in 1979, 
calling for the state to take control of roughly 48 million acres 
of federally-owned, BLM-managed land located within its bor-
ders.290 The law declared that “all public lands in Nevada and 
all minerals not previously appropriated are the property of the 
State of Nevada and subject to its jurisdiction and control.”291 
It also granted to the state land office the authority “to convey, 
lease, license or permit the use of public lands to the same ex-
tent . . . [as] the Federal Government.”292 In other words, the 
Bill authorized the state land office to dispose of federal 
lands.293 “According to the authors of Assembly Bill 413, the 
Sagebrush Rebellion was fueled by the perception that the fed-
eral government was both ignorant and unsympathetic to the 
impact of its policies on the West.”294 Addressing the Kleppe 
controversy specifically, one Nevada sagebrush rebel legislator 
said, “[s]ome of those people from Washington ought to see 
what a wild horse will do to a range and a watering hole.”295 
Seeking to rally political support for its “un-cooperative 
federalism,” Nevada hosted a conference of western states like-
ly to be sympathetic to its cause.296 The conference was an 
overwhelming success. Not only did Nevada receive the support 
of the Western Council of State Governments and the Western 
 
COMM’N OF THE LEGIS. COUNSEL BUREAU, SELECT COMM. ON PUB. LANDS, 
BULLETIN NO. 79-19: REPORT TO THE LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION, 4 (1978) [herein-
after SELECT COMM. ON PUB. LANDS]. 
 289. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 321.596–.599 (1979). See generally Titus, supra note 
260. 
 290. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 321.5973(1) (LexisNexis 2008). 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. § 321.598(1). 
 293. Id. 
 294. LISA SCHOCH-ROBERTS, NAT’L PARK SERV., A CLASSIC WESTERN 
QUARREL: A HISTORY OF THE ROAD CONTROVERSY AT COLORADO NATIONAL 
MONUMENT (quoting CAWLEY, supra note 265, at 96), available at 
http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/colm/adhi1-preface.htm; see also 
SELECT COMM. ON PUB. LANDS, supra note 288, at 6 (decrying the federal govern-
ment’s “lack of awareness of the impact of federal lands on state and local gov-
ernments”). 
 295. Joseph Seldner, The Sagebrush Rebellion, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 1980, at 1 
(quoting State Sen. Keith Ashworth; “a leader in the early Sagebrush Rebellion”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 296. SELECT COMM. ON PUB. LANDS, supra note 288, at 8 (referring to a meet-
ing held in Carson City in 1977); Titus, supra note 260, at 263–64 (marking the 
1978 agreement from the Nevada meeting as the moment that the Sagebrush Re-
bellion transformed from “attitude to actuality”). 
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Interstate Region of the National Association of Counties, but 
the conference also led to the formation of the Western Coali-
tion on Public Lands,297 a primary proponent of the “wise use” 
movement.298 The “wise use” slogan was an outgrowth of the 
Sagebrush Rebellion and would outlast the Rebellion as a rally-
ing point for ranchers and other western commodity interests. 
More importantly, several western states passed their own 
versions of Assembly Bill 413. Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah 
enacted bills similar to Assembly Bill 413 that called for state 
ownership of BLM lands.299 The Arizona legislature even over-
rode Governor Bruce Babbitt’s veto.300 While Nevada pioneered 
legislative attempts to wrest control of public lands from the 
BLM, Wyoming took the approach one step further and laid 
claim not only to BLM lands but also to all Forest Service lands 
within its borders.301 The legislatures of California, Colorado, 
and Idaho took the more tempered and less confrontational 
route of calling for feasibility studies of transferring federally 
owned lands to state ownership.302 
C. Nevada’s Judicial Challenge to FLPMA 
Legislative declarations like Assembly Bill 413 were large-
ly symbolic, for they could not control federal management de-
cisions. But they were rallying points for asserting political ar-
guments about unfair imposition of federal will upon western 
public land users. Similarly, attacks on federal authority 
through litigation could not reasonably be expected to yield ju-
dicial relief. But they could build more political support for 
greater state control of federal resources. That support could 
influence legislation and agency administration of public lands. 
 
 297. SELECT COMM. ON PUB. LANDS, supra note 288, at 8, 14; see also A GUIDE 
TO THE SAGEBRUSH REBELLION COLLECTION, supra note 288. 
 298. Wise Move? (PBS Online Newshour broadcast Feb. 19, 1996), (transcript 
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/environment/wise_use_2-19.html) 
(last visited Dec. 17, 2009). 
 299. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-901 to -909 (Supp. 1981–1982); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 19-5-1 to -10 (Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 65-11-1 to -9 (Supp. 
1981); see also CAWLEY, supra note 265, at 2. 
 300. CAWLEY, supra note 265, at 2. 
 301. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 36-12-109 (1980) (claiming ownership to all federal 
lands within Wyoming except for land controlled by the United States Depart-
ment of Defense, national parks, national monuments, wildlife refuges, wilderness 
areas, and land held in trust for Indians). 
 302. 1980 Cal. Stat. 2607–09; 1980 Colo. Sess. Laws 857–58; 1980 Idaho Sess. 
Laws 1003–04. The Hawaii Senate passed a similar resolution. Titus, supra note 
260, at 264. 
144 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
Spoiling for such a fight, the Nevada State Board of Agri-
culture took the issue of western rangeland control back to 
court with a direct attack on the constitutionality of FLPMA.303 
The ambitious new State Attorney General, Richard H. Bryan, 
used the cause as a stepping-stone to higher office.304 Bryan 
made a second attempt at persuading the bench with the ar-
guments the state had raised in the Kleppe litigation. Again 
arguing for state control of western rangelands, Nevada assert-
ed that “she and all of the public land states had an expectancy 
upon admission into the Union that the unappropriated, unre-
served and vacant lands within their borders would be disposed 
of by patents to private individuals or by grants to the 
States.”305 As in its Kleppe amicus brief, Nevada argued that 
federal control of lands within western states’ borders prevent-
ed those states from standing on an equal footing with other 
states, as required by the Constitution.306 
This argument found no more success with the U.S. dis-
trict court in Nevada than it did in the Supreme Court. Citing 
Kleppe, Judge Reed reminded Nevada and every other western 
state that the Property Clause “entrusts Congress with power 
over the public land without limitations; it is not for the courts 
to say how that trust shall be administered, but for Congress to 
determine.”307 Judge Reed went on to explain that an otherwise 
valid federal regulation does not violate the equal footing doc-
trine “merely because its impact may differ between various 
states because of geographic or economic reasons.”308 The doc-
trine “does not cover economic matters,” the court reasoned, be-
 
 303. Nev. ex rel. Nev. State Bd. of Agric. v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 166, 
168 (D. Nev. 1981), aff’d, 699 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 304. Bryan was elected Nevada governor following his term as attorney gen-
eral and then enjoyed two full terms in the U.S. Senate. See Bryan, Richard H, 
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1774–PRESENT, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=B000993 (last visited Oct. 
4, 2011). 
 305. Nev. ex rel. Nev. State Bd. of Agric. v. United States, 512 F. Supp. at 170 
(quoting Nevada’s brief) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Eugene R. 
Gaetke, Refuting the “Classic” Property Clause Theory, 63 N.C. L. REV. 617, 621 
n.23 (1985) (describing as “a fundamental tenet of the Sagebrush Rebellion” the 
argument that, on admission of the state, the federal government must transfer 
federal lands to the state). 
 306. Nev. ex rel. Nev. State Bd. of Agric. v. United States, 512 F. Supp. at 170; 
see also John D. Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, Politics and 
Federal Lands, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 317, 319–29 (1980) (providing thorough ex-
ploration of equal footing argument).. 
 307. Nev. ex rel. Nev. State Bd. of Agric. v. United States, 512 F. Supp. at 172. 
 308. Id. at 171 (citing Island Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 363 F.2d 
120 (9th Cir. 1966)). 
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cause “there never has been equality among the states in that 
sense.”309 The Ninth Circuit had no trouble affirming the deci-
sion,310 thus putting an end to western states’ legal attempts to 
wrest control of the public rangelands from the federal gov-
ernment. The equal footing issue made a brief encore in Neva-
da’s subsequent litigation to stop the federal government from 
developing a repository for nuclear wastes at Yucca Moun-
tain.311 But, by the time Nevada ranchers challenged federal 
ownership of rangelands under the equal footing doctrine in 
the 1990s, the State sided with the United States in defending 
continued federal control.312 
IV. KLEPPE’S ROLE AS A POLITICAL TOOL 
Despite losses in the courts, the Sagebrush Rebellion (con-
tinuing in its more recent guise as the “states’ rights” or “wise 
use” movement) has proven resilient to changing politics and 
the dramatic demographic shifts in western states. What ac-
counts for the staying power of a movement resting on such a 
weak legal foundation and based largely on an industry with 
shrinking economic importance? 
Many have regarded the Sagebrush Rebellion as a bizarre 
and misguided movement.313 As one author asked, “[w]hy 
would the commodity interests—ranchers, loggers, et al.—want 
to own federal lands that already offered such a bounty of sub-
sidies?”314 The reality is that ranchers did not really want to 
own the federal lands. Instead, ranchers and their representa-
tives sought to stifle the effects of the 1970s federal legislation 
increasing environmental restrictions on and competition for 
the use of the public lands. Laws like the WFRHBA pitted 
ranchers against the federal government by giving horses what 
amounted to unrestricted access to scarce rangeland water and 
 
 309. Id. (citing United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 716 (1950)). 
 310. Nev. ex rel. Nev. State Bd. of Agric. v. United States, 699 F.2d 486 (9th 
Cir. 1983). 
 311. See Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1553 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting 
Property Clause challenge to statute authorizing waste facility); Nuclear Energy 
Inst., Inc., v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 373 F.3d 1251, 1304–305 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(rejecting both Property Clause and equal footing challenges). 
 312. United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314, 1317 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997); see also 
United States v. Nye Cnty., 920 F. Supp. 1108, 1120 (D. Nev. 1996). 
 313. See Babbitt, supra note 260, at 853. 
 314. Donald Snow, The Pristine Silence of Leaving It All Alone, in A WOLF IN 
THE GARDEN, supra note 51, at 28 (citing, for example, “absurdly cheap grazing 
fees”). 
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forage upon which the ranchers depended. The FLPMA exacer-
bated the tensions, even though it left the status quo of the 
Taylor Grazing Act mostly intact and provided special solici-
tude for state interests and plans.315 
The FLPMA required the BLM, for the first time, not only 
to coordinate with and “assure that consideration is given to” 
relevant state-authorized plans, but also to “provide for mean-
ingful public involvement of State and local government offi-
cials.”316 This is a version of cooperative federalism that is 
characterized by “state favoritism in federal process.”317 The 
FLPMA encourages federal agencies to account for state con-
cerns, but often requires little more than that the BLM “pay at-
tention.”318 Ultimately, the agency may adopt its own ideas 
about what is best for federal land management.319 The BLM’s 
regulations, though, go further than FLPMA mandates in 
structuring cooperative federalism.320 The regulations actually 
require every BLM plan to be consistent with state and local 
plans “so long as” the non-federal plans themselves are “con-
sistent with the purposes, policies and programs of Federal 
laws and regulations.”321 This standard invites state and local 
planning to circumscribe BLM discretion in applying land use 
statutes and rules. The BLM regulations also establish a “con-
sistency review” procedure for determining when the BLM will 
accept the recommendations of a governor on a plan.322 The 
 
 315. See Fischman & King, supra note 180. 
 316. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9) (2006). John Leshy cites this provision in stating 
that “it can be argued that the FLPMA gives state and local governments a much 
greater say in federal land management than previously.” Leshy, supra note 243, 
at 348. 
 317. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, supra 
note 267, at 200 (describing this type of cooperative federalism in natural re-
sources law which provides special avenues for states, available to no other stake-
holders (other than tribes), to influence federal decision-making). 
 318. N.M. ex rel. Richardson v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 459 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 
1120–21, (D.N.M. 2006), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 565 F.3d 683 
(10th Cir. 2009) (upholding BLM’s oil and gas development plan for New Mexico’s 
Otero Mesa notwithstanding the objections of the governor and inconsistencies 
with certain state plans); see also Fischman & King, supra note 180, at 162–63 
(discussing Otero Mesa dispute in the context of cooperative federalism). 
 319. N.M. ex rel. Richardson, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 1120–21. 
 320. 43 C.F.R. §§ 1610.3-1 to -.3-2 (2010); see Fischman & King, supra note 
180, at 159–60. 
 321. 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3-2(a). 
 322. The consistency procedure requires the BLM state director to submit each 
proposed BLM plan to the relevant governor for identification of any known in-
consistencies. The governor then has 60 days to identify inconsistencies and pro-
vide recommendations for remedying the BLM plan. If the BLM state director 
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BLM approach to its statute is more accommodating of state 
interests than any other example of state favoritism in federal 
process.323 
A. “Un-cooperative Federalism” as a Legacy of the 
Sagebrush Rebellion 
The importance of cooperative federalism in the FLPMA 
starkly contrasts the Sagebrush Rebellion’s distinctive “un-
cooperative” methods, which also characterize some contempo-
rary assertions of local control over federal lands, especially in 
Utah. In this respect, the Sagebrush Rebellion extends the 
spectrum of “un-cooperative federalism” as conceptualized by 
Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken.324 The most ex-
treme opposition to federal objectives in their model is “civil 
disobedience,” as exemplified by state resolutions opposing fed-
eral policies or declaring that a state will not enforce or partici-
pate in a federal scheme.325 The Sagebrush Rebellion demon-
strates rebellious actions that lie beyond the uncooperative 
endpoint of their continuum, such as state challenges to federal 
legislation (e.g., WFRHBA and FLPMA) and direct interference 
with agency management (as exemplified by the Kane County 
roads dispute, described below).326 
While most states put substantial energy into shaping pub-
lic land policy through the channels created by Congress, the 
rebellion (and its modern “wise use” adherents) rejected the 
role of states as junior partners in resource management. The 
choice to engage in “un-cooperative federalism” did not prevent 
the very same states from quietly pursuing their interests 
through existing statutory avenues to influence public land 
management. Thus, after Nevada enacted its Sagebrush Rebel-
lion bill,327 “state officials hurried to Washington to make sure 
that their claim of ownership would not result in interruption 
 
does not accept the governor’s recommendation(s), then the governor may appeal 
to the national BLM director. 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3-2(e) (2010). 
 323. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, supra 
note 267, at 200. 
 324. See generally Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 18. 
 325. Id. at 1271, 1278–80. 
 326. See infra notes 332–43 and accompanying text. 
 327. See supra notes 289–95 and accompanying text (discussing Assembly Bill 
413). 
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of federal payments to the state which were based on continu-
ing federal land ownership.”328 
The Sagebrush Rebellion was an effort of a frustrated mi-
nority, accustomed to power, that had been beaten back not 
just by the power of the Property Clause but also by the envi-
ronmental movement’s legislative success. Protests under the 
Sagebrush Rebellion, and the related “wise use” banner, con-
tinue to directly challenge federal authority.329 Rather than “a 
last gasp of a passing era,”330 the Sagebrush Rebellion signaled 
the continued vitality of “un-cooperative federalism” as a tool 
for political leverage. 
For instance, Kane County, Utah engages in an ongoing 
battle with the federal government over road claims on public 
lands in southern Utah. Kane County stands with a new “Sage-
brush Coalition” in opposing federal efforts to close roads or 
limit motor vehicle access on federal lands.331 Like the Kleppe 
challenge to the WFRHBA, the county was spurred into action 
by what it perceived as federal overreaching into the domain of 
traditional local control. On September 18, 1996, President 
Clinton designated 1.9 million acres in southern Utah, includ-
ing part of Kane County, as the Grand Staircase-Escalante Na-
tional Monument.332 Almost immediately thereafter, Kane 
County commissioners approved the grading of what the coun-
ty called “roads” in federal wilderness study areas and in the 
national monument.333 The BLM called them “primitive 
trails.”334 Crews employed by the county graded sixteen of the-
 
 328. COGGINS ET AL., supra note 24, at 77. 
 329. See sources cited supra note 29. 
 330. Leshy, supra note 243, at 349; see also Clayton, supra note 265, at 533 
(asserting that “[r]ather than fight for ownership of the public lands, a battle they 
will surely lose, the Rebels should concentrate their efforts on attempting to 
achieve increased control over the public land management decision process,” and 
concluding that the Rebellion would result in “cooperative federalism seldom par-
alleled in the nation’s history”). 
 331. See Jackson, supra note 29. 
 332. Establishment of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, 61 
Fed. Reg. 50,223 (Sept. 18, 1996). Utah reacted with animosity. See, e.g., James 
Brooke, New Reserve Stirs Animosities in Utah, N.Y. TIMES Oct. 13, 1996, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/13/us/new-reserve-stirs-animosities-in-
utah.html?scp=1&sq=grand+staircase-escalante&st=nyt. 
 333. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 742 
(10th Cir. 2005) [hereinafter SUWA]; see also Larry Warren, Utah Counties Bull-
doze the BLM, Park Service, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS Oct. 28, 1996, 
http://www.hcn.org/issues/92/2868/print_view. 
 334. SUWA, 425 F.3d at 742. The county claimed title to over 60 roads on fed-
eral lands, and “at least 30 roads within or on the boundary of Grand Staircase-
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se “roads” without getting approval from the BLM or even noti-
fying the agency.335 Kane County defiantly claimed ownership 
of the rights-of-way under an 1866 statute commonly called RS 
2477.336 But even if the county possessed the rights under RS 
2477, it would need BLM’s permission to conduct improve-
ments on federal lands that go beyond mere maintenance of the 
paths’ historical use.337 Prompted by the Southern Utah Wil-
derness Alliance, the BLM sought an injunction against the 
county,338 which commenced a protracted and multifaceted ba-
ttle that remains mired in the courts. 
In August 2005, Kane County upped the ante by enacting 
an ordinance opening some primitive trails on federal lands, 
including the national monument, to off-road vehicle (ORV) 
use, contravening BLM policy.339 The BLM then attempted to 
close those same areas to such uses, but the county later took 
down the BLM signs and placed its own signs indicating the 
routes were “open.”340 Challenged in court by environmental 
groups, the county initially lost on the merits only to succeed in 
getting the case dismissed for lack of standing.341 Representing 
Kane County in the dispute over roads in Grand Staircase-
Escalante National Monument was none other than Mike Lee, 
the Utah eminent domain bill supporter who rode to the Senate 
on the latest iteration of the “un-cooperative federalism” 
 
Escalante National Monument.” Eryn Gable, Court Rules Enviros Can’t Challenge 
Utah County’s Road Claims, LAND LETTER, Jan. 13, 2011. 
 335. SUWA, 425 F.3d at 742; Gable, supra note 334. 
 336. Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 8, 14 Stat. 251, 253 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 
932), repealed by Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
579 § 706(a), 90 Stat. 2743 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §1701 (2006)). While 
new RS 2477 rights could not be created after 1976, “valid” RS 2477 rights exist-
ing at the date of repeal continue in effect. SUWA, 425 F.3d at 741. FLPMA pro-
vided no procedure to validate or record existing RS 2477 rights. Id. 
 337. SUWA, 425 F.3d at 745. 
 338. Id. at 743. 
 339. The Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., 470 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1303 (D. Utah 
2006). The court granted plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint in order to 
add the BLM and the Fish and Wildlife Service as defendants for a claim under 
the Endangered Species Act. Id. at 1308–09. The District Court again addressed 
the merits of the case in 2008. See The Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., 560 F. 
Supp. 2d 1147 (D. Utah 2008) (holding that county ordinance allowing ORV use 
on federal land was preempted by federal law), aff’d, 581 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 
2009), rev’d on other grounds, 632 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding environ-
mental groups lacked standing to challenge county claims to RS 2477 rights on 
federal public land). 
 340. The Wilderness Soc’y, 560 F. Supp. 2d at 1154–56. 
 341. The Wilderness Soc’y, 632 F.3d at 1165. 
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movement: the Tea Party.342 Despite its tenuous legal found-
ation, the county’s strategy of “un-cooperative federalism” has 
reaped some practical dividends. In 2010, the Obama admin-
istration stipulated that five of the Kane County claims had 
perfected rights under RS 2477, including Skutumpah Road, 
which cuts through Grand Staircase-Escalante National Mon-
ument.343 In 2011, Utah began dipping into its appropriations 
under the 2010 eminent domain law to assert ownership of 
rights-of-way in the neighboring Garfield County portion of 
Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument. 
B. Social Science Perspective on Kleppe’s Role in the 
Sagebrush Rebellion 
Social scientists who have studied political movements’ use 
of confrontational litigation offer lessons applicable to the 
Kleppe story. One lesson is that the “Sagebrush Rebellion” may 
be a better term than “states’ rights” because it reflects the 
kind of coalition-building necessary to achieve success in the 
executive and legislative branches when judicially enforceable 
rights are not available.344 While United States culture may 
conceive of political ideals in terms of fights for rights in courts, 
failure in the judicial forum does not foreclose success in other 
arenas.345 In the end, “states’ rights” in federal natural re-
sources law may be more important as a political rallying cry 
than a judicial doctrine.346 
 
 342. Gable, supra note 334; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text (de-
scribing Mike Lee’s role in promoting Utah’s 2010 eminent domain law). 
 343. The victory is a limited one, however, as the federal government likely re-
tains the power to make reasonable regulations respecting rights-of-way on public 
land. See Hale v. Norton, 461 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (reaffirming princi-
ple that rights-of-way through federal lands are subject to reasonable regulation 
by the United States); The Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., 581 F.3d 1198, 1229 
n.4 (10th Cir. 2009) (McConnell, J., dissenting) (conceding that even if the county 
established valid RS 2477 claims, the federal government retained “substantial 
regulatory authority” over the rights-of-way). At least one other right-of-way, Bald 
Knoll Road, was previously acknowledged by the BLM. Christine Hoekenga, The 
Road More Traveled, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Oct. 1, 2007; Rachel Jackson, Coun-
ties Cross the Yellow Line, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, July 20, 2001. 
 344. EPP, supra note 14, at 13 (emphasis added). 
 345. Id. at 15–16. 
 346. Another vehicle for states’ rights constitutional claims is the Tenth 
Amendment, although this route is unlikely to see much more success than the 
states’ previous arguments. See, e.g., Shepard, supra note 23, at 528–32 (exploring 
Tenth Amendment claims cases after Kleppe which raised the Tenth Amendment 
as an issue, and the likelihood of this argument’s success in the future). 
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Another lesson emerges from Eve S. Weinbaum’s study of 
community-based activism in Tennessee to fight plant closings, 
de-industrialization, and economic inequality. She tells a simi-
lar “story of failure” in a very different context from Kleppe.347 
The central characters in her story had far less access to power 
in state government than the ranchers in the Sagebrush Rebel-
lion. Nonetheless, Weinbaum’s research illustrates how dispar-
ate but “organized, aggressive, confrontational” social move-
ments348 can build institutions, “activist networks, and long-
term coalitions” in losing battles, which “created the conditions 
for later success.”349  
Failures—rather than resulting in humiliation and depres-
sion—can create the context for social change and pivotal 
political movements. Successful failures do not always 
transform the economy, or the social or political landscape, 
but they can accomplish crucial outcomes.350 
The story of Kleppe fits Weinbaum’s category of a “success-
ful failure.”351 The Sagebrush Rebellion would repeat, often in-
tentionally, quixotic lawsuits. Indeed, the legislative history of 
Nevada’s Assembly Bill 413 explicitly recognized the usefulness 
of doomed litigation to the larger cause of reducing federal  
limitations on public land users.352 Utah’s 2010 law353 illus-
trates the continuing popularity of this approach. 
The converse to Weinbaum’s term—one might call it a 
“failed success”—is also evident in the struggle over public 
rangeland management. An important limitation of activism 
through courts is that winning a case does not necessarily en-
sure compliance.354 An example of this is the litigation that Ol-
iver Houck highlights as the pivotal case paving the way for 
enactment of the FLPMA.355 The environmentalist victory in 
NRDC v. Morton did require the BLM to conduct comprehen-
 
 347. WEINBAUM, supra note 14, at 7. 
 348. Id. at 10. 
 349. Id. at 8. 
 350. Id. at 267. 
 351. Of course, sometimes litigation losses lead to more failure. Benjamin I. 
Sachs has shown how this is true in labor organizing, where collective action de-
pends on workers’ self-reinforcing dynamic of success. Benjamin I. Sachs, Em-
ployment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2690 (2008). 
 352. See supra notes 283–87 and accompanying text. 
 353. H.B. 143, 58th Leg., Gen. Sess., 2010 Utah Laws (codified at UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78B-6-503.5 (West 2010)). 
 354. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 13, at 117–18. 
 355. Houck, The Water, the Trees, and the Land, supra note 22, at 2305–07. 
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sive environmental impact analyses to evaluate the relation-
ship between range conditions and grazing.356 But it did not 
ensure full compliance. Environmental impact analysis  
continues to lag far behind public rangeland decision-making, 
and has not made much of a dent in allotment stocking deci-
sions.357 
Unsurprisingly, the legal literature concentrates more on 
the outcomes of litigation than social science research,358 which 
views success or failure through a wider lens. The late Stuart 
Scheingold pioneered the use of political science to better un-
derstand the practical, on-the-ground changes wrought by di-
sputes over rights. Scheingold’s analytical framework “de-
center[s]” law to shift its focus from authoritative institutions, 
such as courts, to “the more fluid terrain” of intermediate insti-
tutions, such as agencies and civil society organizations.359 The 
“decenter[ed]” view we present of Kleppe reveals substantial 
success in intermediate institutions, such as the BLM, which 
has largely insulated ranchers from their worst fears and envi-
ronmentalists’ best hopes of public land law reform. 
Scheingold’s conclusions about the politics of rights nicely 
summarize the meaning of Kleppe, the rise of the Sagebrush 
Rebellion, and public rangeland reform. Judicial acceptance of 
rights or other legal arguments does not 
mean that the goal will be embraced more generally nor 
that the social changes implied will be effected. If there is 
opposition elsewhere in the system, the judicial decision is 
more likely to engender than to resolve political conflict. In 
that conflict, a right is best treated as a resource of uncer-
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tain worth, but essentially like other political resources: 
money, numbers, status, and so forth.360 
Similarly, New Mexico’s failure in Kleppe did not doom 
state resistance to federal public land reform or dampen ranch-
ers’ objections to incorporating environmental values in natural 
resource allocation. Instead, it helped spark the Sagebrush Re-
bellion and a host of spin-off movements that succeeded with 
money, status in agency deliberations, and political allies as of-
ten as they failed in courts. 
Perhaps even more relevant for understanding the role of 
Kleppe in the Sagebrush Rebellion is the recent work of Mi-
chael Klarman on the civil rights movement.361 His analysis of 
Brown v. Board of Education362 cautions that even the highest 
profile Supreme Court decisions themselves do not (necessari-
ly) directly prompt change. He argues that it was the southern 
backlash in response to Brown, rather than the holding itself, 
that catalyzed real reform in practice, especially in the form of 
the federal civil rights laws of the 1960s.363 
Notwithstanding that Kleppe has no place in the pantheon 
of the most important decisions of the Court, Professor Klar-
man’s work offers two lessons for our story. First, commenta-
tors should resist the urge to exaggerate the extent to which a 
judicial opinion directly alters the social-legal framework for 
allocating influence and power.364 For example, Brown itself 
arguably failed directly to end legal segregation in the deep 
South.365 Certainly, Kleppe failed to stanch western state “un-
cooperation” with federal land management objectives. As law-
yers ourselves, we perhaps exaggerate the direct role of Kleppe 
in our enthusiasm to connect legislation, litigation, administra-
tion, and politics.366 Second, court decisions may be most im-
 
 360. Id. at 7; see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW 
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (documenting legally adjudicated rights 
playing only a marginal role in resolving on-the-ground conflicts in the context of 
social norms of liability among ranchers in northern California). 
 361. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); Michael J. Klarman, 
How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81 
(1994), available at JSTOR. 
 362. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 363. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 361; Klarman, 
How Brown Changed Race Relations, supra note 361, at 82. 
 364. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations, supra note 361, at 81. 
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portant for their indirect impacts on political discourse through 
backlash.367 Klarman argues that it was the violent, massive 
resistance to Brown that had the greatest impact on politics 
and stands as its lasting legacy.368 He summarizes this argu-
ment in stating that “the post-Brown racial backlash created a 
political environment in which southern elected officials stood 
to benefit at the polls by boldly defying federal authority.”369 
While the backlash in the West cannot be compared to the 
South’s mass resistance to Brown v. Board of Education, “un-
cooperative federalism” certainly pays dividends at the polls. 
Just ask Utah’s Senator Mike Lee. 
CONCLUSION 
With its legal arguments shredded, one might imagine the 
Sagebrush Rebellion died a simple death. But it lived on, fueled 
by the very litigation losses that seem to mark its failure. 
Kleppe was the first great court battle of the rebellion. In many 
ways, it served as the template for subsequent legal tactics that 
helped build political support for the ranching interests and 
other private property concerns reflected in western state ide-
ology. 
It would be hard to imagine how the basic narrative of the 
WFRHBA’s enactment and the Kleppe decision could be worse 
for ranchers. They completely failed to shape the legislation in 
Congress and lost badly in the Supreme Court. More broadly, 
the Sagebrush Rebellion, which the WFRHBA and Kleppe 
helped spur, enjoyed no major judicial victories. Yet, as Utah 
prepares to spend millions more on futile litigation,370 the  
Sagebrush Rebellion continues to enjoy success in setting the 
terms of political debate, and electing officials who will advance 
the rhetoric of state control. By framing the issues as ones of 
states’ rights and local culture, the sagebrush rebels offered an 
alternative narrative to downplay ecological concerns of over-
grazing. Congress inadvertently paved the way with the 
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WFRHBA, which did not rest on ecological grounds and dis-
tracted reformers from the problems of livestock overgrazing. 
The sagebrush rebels may have peddled legal theories based on 
a “mendacious myth” about the Constitution and federal pow-
er.371 But myths exert great power over the way people under-
stand the world and its conflicts. So despite all the failures, the 
rebellion and its modern progeny successfully resisted major 
reforms of grazing management aimed at restoring the ecologi-
cal condition of the public range. 
The story of Kleppe and its aftermath shows how legisla-
tive frustration and court losses sustain popular movements. In 
this respect, the sagebrush rebels and their kin in the wise use, 
states’ rights, Tea Party, and property rights movements share 
important characteristics with the traditionally liberal causes 
of civil rights and economic justice. At the dawn of the modern 
era of public land law, the perennial complaints of public land 
states moved into courtrooms, mimicking the tactics of the very 
environmentalists they abhorred. Both interests gained politi-
cal leverage as a result. 
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